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Abstract
The present doctoral thesis studies the association between pre-colonial institutions and
long-run development in Latin America. The thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 1 places the motivation of the thesis by underlying relevant contributions in
the literature on long-run development. I then set out the main objective of the thesis,
followed by a brief outline of it.
In Chapter 2, I study the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on present-day socioeco-
nomic outcomes for Latin America. The main thesis of this chapter is that more advanced
pre-colonial institutions relate to better socioeconomic outcomes today - principally, but
not only, through their e¤ects on the Amerindian population. I test such hypothesis with
a dataset of 324 sub-national administrative units covering all mainland Latin American
countries. The extensive range of controls covers factors such as climate, location, natural
resources, colonial activities and pre-colonial characteristics - plus country xed e¤ects.
Results strongly support the main thesis.
In Chapter 3, I further analyse the association between pre-colonial institutions and
present-day economic development in Latin America by using the historical ethnic home-
lands as my main unit of analysis. The main hypothesis is that ethnic homelands inhabited
by more advanced ethnic groups -as measured by their levels of institutional complexity-
relate to better economic development today. To track these long-run e¤ects, I construct
a new dataset by digitising historiographical maps allowing me to pinpoint the geospatial
location of ethnic homelands as of the XVI century. As a result, 375 ethnic homelands are
created. I then capture the levels of economic development at the ethnic homeland level
by making use of alternative economic measures satellite light density data. After con-
trolling for country-specic characteristics and applying a large battery of geographical,
locational, and historical factors, I found that the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions relate
to a higher light density as a proxy for economic activity- in ethnic homelands where
more advanced ethnic groups lived.
In Chapter 4, I explore a mechanism linking the persistence of pre-colonial institutions
in Latin America over the long-run: Colonial and post-colonial strategies along with the
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ethnic political capacity worked in tandem allowing larger Amerindian groups to "support"
the new political systems in ways that would benet their respective ethnic groups as well
as the population at large. This mechanism may have allowed the e¤ects of pre-colonial
institutions to inuence socioeconomic development outcomes up to today. To shed lights
on this mechanism, I combine the index of pre-colonial institutions prepared for the second
chapter of the present thesis with individual-level survey data on peoples attitudes. By
controlling for key observable and unobservable country-specic characteristics, the main
empirical results show that areas with a history of more advanced pre-colonial institutions
increase the probability of individuals supporting present-day political institutions.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarise the main ndings of the thesis, and emphasise the
key weaknesses of the study as well as potential avenues for future research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and main objective of the thesis
"So catastrophic and irrevocable were the changes that is tempting to think that almost
nothing survived from the past. This is wrong: landscape and people remain, though
greatly altered. And they have lessons to heed, both about the earth on which we all live,
and about the mental frames we bring to it".
(Mann 2005, p. 315)
Understanding of how developing countries got to where they are now is becoming a
devoted line of research within the economic literature these days. Knowing this rightly
allows us to see not only where we want head in the future but also how we want to
move forward. Yet until recently, scholars interested in this eld of study have examined
the long-run of wealth and poverty of the Developing World from a particular historical
perspective: the role of colonial institutions.
The emphasis of such colonial approach is on the transmission of forces coming from
the Western civilisation via the phenomenon of colonisation. The main arguments of this
approach are based on the idea that developing countries are nowadays rich or poor de-
pending on what Europeans brought and the di¤erent ways by which the new settlements
took place. For example, amongst other factors, Europeans brought their own language
and legal systems with them and, as a result, a rather di¤erent set of institutional frame-
work in the Developing World was put in place. These factors are then ideal sources of
exogenous variation to explain econometrically the institutional di¤erences a¤ecting the
paths of economic development over the long-run.
A seminal paper studying the e¤ects of colonial institutions on contemporary devel-
opment is that of Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997). They studied, in a narrative way, the
long-run development in the Americas by looking at the ways that colonisation took o¤ in
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front of factor endowments. They put forward the hypothesis that places with lands rich
in mineral resources such as gold and silver along with advanced pre-colonial societies,
developed institutions that supported forced labour activities. Similarly, colonies that
were endowed with climate and land suitable for trading commodities, developed planta-
tion activities giving rise to the use of slave labour. The new institutional arrangements
in place then established an uneven socioeconomic system based on a concentration of
landownership and an intensive extraction of natural resources. All this resulted in the
formation of forces that gave way to social and economic inequalities that have persisted
to our days in particular in the area what we know today as Latin America.
In a later seminal paper of Acemoglu et al. (2001), a ground-breaking hypothesis was
introduced placing the role of colonial institutions as one of the most relevant drivers in
shaping economic development in the long-run. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued that the
type of colonial institutions in place all along the colonised World varied as a result of
geographical determinants in particular the disease environment. Using countries as their
main unit of analysis across the globe, they put forward the thesis that in colonies with
temperate environments the degree of European mortality rates was signicantly lower
than in colonies with more tropical enviroments such as Central America or sub-Saharan
Africa. This, in turn, resulted in a higher European settlement. As such, a type of colonial
rule based mainly on Western values and beliefs was then put in place, giving way to a
institutional framework with robust mechanisms of checks and balances. On the other
hand, colonies with more tropical enviroments increased the European mortality rates as
a result ot diseases such as malaria. Hence, European settlement did not take the same
proportion. In these colonies, Europeans pursued extractive methods relying on -most of
the time- the numerous native population and social organisation to extract resources in
the detriment of everthing else. Under this adverse context, the colonial rule lacked of
incentives in setting up robust institutions similar as the ones in place in the colonies with
more pro-Western environments. Acemoglu et al. (2001) used European mortality rates as
an instrument for todays institutions -specically they used a measure of expropiation risk
as a proxy for institutions on property rights- to capture the casual e¤ect of institutions
on contemporary development in a cross-section of countries at global scale.
Followed the works of Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), an
extensive and notable volume of studies stressing the role of colonial institutions dominated
our attention as to what and how we should understand the paths of economic development
in the long-run. Indeed, the colonial experience changed the colonised World in many
ways. French, English, Spanish or Portuguese colonisers put in place values and beliefs
resembling those from their country of origin, for which case invariably the life and space
of the native population of the Developing World got to be transformed ever since. While
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this is true as documented in the literature, we must not forget that these colonies were the
homeland of a large variety of societies with their own special set of social characteristics.
Thus, as the Western values and beliefs shaped the paths of economic development in the
colonised World over the long-run, this should also be the case when considering the social
characteristics of the societies that lived before colonisation and of course with its own
type of degree and settings.
Certainly, scholars have not disregarded entirely what was before colonisation in search-
ing for the ultimate drivers of development over the long-run. Indeed, some studies do
take into account this part of history. Yet somehow this analysis focuses principally on
making the case for the persistence of the colonial experience. A good example of this
line of research is that of Acemoglu et al. (2002). They put forward the hypothesis that
the richest pre-colonial societies are today amongst the poorest areas in the World. Using
a cross-section of countries, they capture the development of societies prior colonisation
by making use of a measure of population density in 1500. The historical narrative as to
how this reversal of fortune came to happen is simple to grasp. Typically, advanced pre-
colonial societies such as the Incas or Aztecs in the Americas had cities highly urbanised.
After the Conquest, such element of urbanisation was essential for the colonisers in the
extraction of natural resources. As noted before, this type of colonial rule set up extractive
strategies over time. On the other hand, in areas considered as less advanced or poorer
prior colonisation -as reected by population density in 1500-, the colonial rule somewhat
reversed the institutional settings already in place there resulting in countries where pro-
development strategies were the rule to follow. The divergence in development started
to take o¤ by the 19th century when the opportunities for countries to get industrialised
were only possible in those areas where the colonial rule gave way to institutions based on
Western values and beliefs. The key rational of this study is not to capture a direct e¤ect
of pre-colonial factors on present-day development but instead via the colonial experience,
placing once again at centre of the discussion the superiority of colonial institutions.
It is perhaps understandable, however, why the studies addressing the development in
the long-run have not yet factored in the direct e¤ect of pre-colonial factors on present-day
development. The paucity of data as far as 500 years ago in most of the colonised World
is quite usual. While exceptional e¤orts in constructing adequate historical measures of
development have been done, scholars still need to deal with key empirical challenges in
light of the almost unavoidable scenario of ommited-variable bias; in which case country-
level studies are the most a¤ected. As such, recent studies have shifted the analysis to a
ner empirical inspection dened at the subnational level. Yet again the focus of these
studies is essentially on the role of colonial institutions.
A key paper studying the long-run development at subnational level is that of Bruhn
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and Gallego (2012). They use a cross-section of 345 subnational states in the Americas
to study the association between the main economic activities in place during the early
colonial period and present-day development. Supported by the main ndings of Engerman
and Sokolo¤ (1997), they argue that the colonial economic activities based on exploited
labour such as mining, plantation, sugar, etc. what they called as "bad" activities is
negatively correlated with contemporary development. Moreover, and relying on a novel
measure of pre-colonial population density dened at subnational level-, they nd that
regions where other colonial economic activities were undertaken like cattle or farming,
are adversed for development over the long-run only if these regions had large native
population to be exploited. Additionally, and as noted in Acemoglu et al. (2002), they
also capture a strong negative association between their measure of pre-colonial population
density and present-day development -as reected principally by income per capita.
In e¤ect, Bruhn and Gallegos ndings echo the line of research placing the role of
colonial institutions as a key driver for long-run development in the Developing World.
Futhermore, it is noteworthy to highlight that these type of studies have enabled sholars to
control for a sizable e¤ect of revelant unobservable country-specic characteristics a¤ecting
the variation of development by means of country-xed e¤ects. For example, national
factors other than those specically controlled for may be behind the statistical relationship
between colonial institutions and long-run development. Subnational level studies -and in
specic the application of country-xed e¤ects- seem to address this empirical issue.
Turning our attention to the main hypothesis that the present doctoral thesis is putting
forward. While the process of colonialism modied the reality and fortune of the societies
that Europeans encounted at their arrival, some pre-colonial factors survived and, thus,
interacted with the colonial rule as rightly pointed out already in the literature. What
remained then, I believe, may have carried the persistence of pre-colonial culture and
institutions all along the colonial and post-colonial periods, and thus have a¤ected the
long-run development in the Developing World as well.
And indeed, the above assertion has been the line of study of a novel strand in the
literature analysing the direct e¤ects of pre-colonial factors on long-run development of
developing countries. Yet all these studies have directed their attention to the African
case. A starting point of this new set of studies is the work of Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007), who uncover a strong positive association between pre-colonial institutions and
various measures of socioeconomic outcomes in a cross-section of countries mainly from
sub-Saharan Africa. They measure institutions using a categorical variable that classies
ethnic groups according to their level of political complexity drawn from the pioneering
anthropological data of George Peter Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967).
Nevertheless, as noted before, country level studies like this one may be more questionable
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due to the large unobservable country-specic characteristics left unquantied, and as such
they may be possibly behind this relationship.
In a later study, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) advanced the work of Gen-
naioli and Rainer (2007) by using ethnic groups as their main unit of analysis in order
to explore the relationship between pre-colonial institutions and long-run development in
the Africa context. As in Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013) used the same anthropological variable of Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas in order
to measure the institutions from the pre-colonial period. In addition to conrming the
main hypothesis that was introduced by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), the unit of analysis
-ethnic groups- used by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) allowed them to apply
country-xed e¤ects as a relevant empirical strategy to control for unobservable national
factors.
As correctly emphasised by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou (2013), somewhat a few more studies have stressed these days the relevance
of other pre-colonial factors in development over the long-run principally in the Africa
context. For example, Nunn (2008) uncovered a strong negative association between slave
trade undertaken during the pre-colonial period and contemporary development in Africa.
Yet what it is noteworthy to remark at this point is that all these studies have allowed us
to rethink our understanding about the way that societies got to where they are now from
a di¤erent historical perspective: the role of pre-colonial characteristics. Recognising, and
most important, knowing the extent to which this other layer of social characteristics has
a¤ected the development over the long-run must be weighed up together with the colonial
aspects. And this is what the present doctoral thesis aims.
Thus, the main objective of the present doctoral thesis is to study, specically, the ef-
fects of pre-colonial institutions on long-run development in the context of Latin Amer-
ica1. Quite rightly, in the Latin American case di¤erent realities and historical events
arise as compared to the African setting. Colonialism was not only much longer lasting
than in other regions of the world, about three centuries for most Latin American nations,
but it was also accompanied by a massive transformation of the ethnic structure of the
population. While correct, this should not lead us to conclude that pre-colonial culture
was simply wiped out following the European arrival and had no chance of inuencing
the present. Western culture may well be the dominant element in present-day Latin
America, as best exemplied by the almost universal adoption of the Christian religion
1The thesis will not be covering countries in North America. This is indeed a research choice. The
countries I will cover were all colonized by Spain, with the exception of Brazil which was colonized
by Portugal. I believe this results in a similar colonial experience and a signicant degree of cultural
proximity across the countries analysed. Including Canada or the United States would render the sample
substantially more diverse, and results could be driven by these two countries.
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and the languages from Portugal and Spain, but in numerous cases this dominance con-
tains important elements of the native culture. Pre-colonial rites, such as o¤erings to the
Mother-Earth, are still common among large sections of the Latin American population
and do not stop those who perform them from attending the Sunday Mass. And pre-
colonial languages such as quechua or nahuatl (the lingua francas of the former Inca and
Aztec empires) can be easily heard in the food markets of cities and towns across the
Andes and central Mexico. Elements of pre-colonial culture have survived ve centuries
of colonial and post-colonial regimes, and the present thesis discusses how this took place
and why it could matter for the analysis of current socioeconomic outcomes.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The present doctoral thesis studies the relationship between pre-colonial institutions and
long-run development in Latin America. In Chapter 2 and 3, I will explore the direct e¤ects
of pre-colonial institutions on present-day development in a cross-section of subnational
units in Latin America. While Chapter 2 uses subnational states as the main unit of
analysis, Chapter 3 uses ethnic groups both units though are dened below the national
level. In Chapter 4, I will explore a mechanism linking the persistence of pre-colonial
institutions over the long-run. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes outlining weaknesses and
potential areas for future research.
As noted above, subnational level studies are currently used as a relevant way to re-
duce identication problems arising from historical shocks, cultural adaptations, or colo-
nial and post-colonial institutions by means of country-xed e¤ects. Motivated by this
type of method, in Chapter 2 I use as my main unit of analysis the largest administrative
divisions of each country in Latin America below the national level called states. Thus,
the chapter relies on a new constructed dataset by making use of statistics from 324 sub-
national administrative units. To measure the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions in each
unit of observation, a novel index is then constructed with the information of the pop-
ulation shares of the di¤erent Amerindian groups at the state level as well as data on
the political complexity of ethnic groups drawn from Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas. The
historical narrative essentially makes the case for the persistency of pre-colonial institu-
tions. Specically, it is argued that pre-colonial institutions survived to our days thanks
to the existence of largely self-governed Amerindian communities in rural Latin America.
Overall, the main result shows that more advanced pre-colonial institutions relate to bet-
ter socioeconomic outcomes today - principally, but not only, through their e¤ects on the
Amerindian population.
In Chapter 3, I further analyse the association between pre-colonial institutions and
6
present-day economic development in Latin America from an innovative empirical fashion.
I use the historical ethnic homelands as my main unit of analysis rather than subnational
states. While this method is widely used in the African context, for the Latin American
case there is no formal studies addressing such relationship through the e¤ects of the
historical ethnic homelands. Certainly, the major di¢ culty for this type of studies is
the paucity of the required data. While data on the geospatial location of ethnic groups
is indeed available, all the opened sources construct their own datasets on the basis of
the modern location of ethnic groups around the world including those from the Latin
American countries. This, however, may make less tenable a unit of analysis that is meant
to have di¤used an e¤ect 500 years ago. Knowing the historical location of the ethnic
groups before colonisation may be far too more revealing when it comes to uncover an
historical e¤ect within a specic geographical area. By using Geographical Information
System, in Chapter 3, I thus construct a new dataset by digitising historiographical maps
allowing me to pinpoint the geospatial location of ethnic homelands as of the XVI century.
The method, indeed, comes with its own methodological challenges and di¤erences as the
one from Chapter 2, yet it is very striking to see that the persistency of pre-colonial
institutions is again uncovered. The Chapter shows that ethnic homelands inhabited by
more advanced ethnic groups -as measured by their levels of institutional complexity-
relate to better economic development today -as reected by satellite light density data,
which proxy for economic activity at the required level of analysis.
The persistency of pre-colonial institutions is studied empirically in Chapter 4 using
a mechanism related to the ethnic political capacity and the main strategy of dominance
implemented by the colonial and post-colonial systems. The historical narrative under-
lines the variation of political capacity of ethnic groups. Typically, larger ethnic groups
were more likely to have endured the new systems through their highly advanced polit-
ical capacity inherited from their native institutional frameworks. Additionally, in light
of the overwhelming geographical conditions, colonisers set up an indirect rule resulting
in numerous self-governed Amerindian communities. These two forces -ethnic political
capacity and colonial and post-colonial strategies- may have given rise in areas tradition-
ally inhabited by larger groups to some degree of "support" to the new political systems,
triggering as a result better social and economic benets in both the Amerindian com-
munities and the rest of the population. To shed lights on this mechanism, I combine
the index of pre-colonial institutions constructed in Chapter 2 with individual-level survey
data on peoples attitudes. The main empirical results show that areas with a history of
more advanced pre-colonial institutions increase the probability of individuals supporting
present-day political institutions. This degree of "support" may o¤er some evidence of
such mechanism linking the persistency of pre-colonial institutions over the long-run.
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Chapter 2
Pre-colonial Institutions and
Socioeconomic Development: The
Case of Latin America
Abstract
I study the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on present-day socioeconomic outcomes
for Latin America. The main hypothesis is that more advanced pre-colonial institutions
relate to better socioeconomic outcomes today - principally, but not only, through their
e¤ects on the Amerindian population. I test the hypothesis with a dataset of 324 sub-
national administrative units covering all mainland Latin American countries. The exten-
sive range of controls covers factors such as climate, location, natural resources, colonial
activities and pre-colonial characteristics - plus country xed e¤ects. Results strongly
support the main hypothesis.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the economics literature searching for the ultimate drivers of the
wealth and poverty of nations has given considerable attention to the role of institutions.
Taking the theoretical discussions of Douglass North as a starting point (North 1981;
North 1990), the literature has progressed mainly along empirical lines and produced an
impressive array of supporting evidence: see Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al.
(2001) for two important early contributions, and Acemoglu et al. (2005) for a review of
the literature.
As has been noted before, most of this literature focuses on the role of colonial insti-
tutions - the institutional package that European colonial powers put in place throughout
the world between the 16th and 20th centuries. There are indeed good reasons for focusing
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on the impact of colonialism on institutional development in countries outside Europe. For
a start, colonialism was often a deeply disrupting process that radically modied the way
societies were structured. Factors such as the content and direction of trade, the nature
of taxation, and the operation of the law were always a¤ected. Furthermore, colonialism
reached the vast majority of countries we now call the Developing World (plus a few coun-
tries from todays Developed World), making it an ideal source of exogenous variation of
institutional quality in cross-country comparisons.
While the importance of colonialism is well-recognized in this context, recent research
has progressively uncovered a large role for pre-colonial factors as well. Most of this
research has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, a continent where colonialism arrived late
(most of the African interior was largely unknown to Europeans until the 1880s), did not
last very long (African decolonisation took o¤ during the late 1950s), and where, with the
exception of South Africa and its neighbours, European settlement was of very limited
importance. Under these conditions, it is perhaps not surprising that pre-colonial factors
transcend the colonial period and a¤ect African societies to this day.
A good example of this line of research is Nunn (2008), who shows how the intensity
of the African slave trade over the pre-colonial period is negatively related to current
levels of income per capita. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) expand on this by uncovering a
relationship between the intensity of the slave trade and present-day levels of interpersonal
trust. Also of relevance, Huillery (2011) argues that the attitudes of pre-colonial African
states towards Europeans have an inuence on current development outcomes as colonizers
invested more in the areas where Africans were less hostile.
Turning to pre-colonial institutions, Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013) uncover a positive link between the institutional characteristics of
African ethnic groups, as prevalent in the pre-colonial period, and present-day measures of
socioeconomic development. Both papers measure institutions using the same categorical
variable that classies ethnic groups according to their level of political complexity (a value
of 0 denotes bands and tribes, while the maximum value of 4 is for complex states). The
data is taken from George Peter Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967), which
codes more than 60 variables for 1267 ethnic groups around the world1.
It is important to note that the Atlas attempts to describe ethnic groups in the absence
of foreign elements, in particular colonial inuence. For the Latin American case this often
implies a reliance on historical sources in addition to direct anthropological evidence. For
1The Ethnographic Atlas has been expanded and updated several times since its publica-
tion. The current version, used in this paper, is due to Gray (1999) and can be accessed at
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Ethnographic_Atlas
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instance, for several important ethnic groups such as the Incas, Aztecs, Mayas, Chibchas
or Tarascans, the "approximate time to which the data pertain" is given as the 1500s.
Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) use African nations as their unit of analysis and uncover
a positive relationship between pre-colonial institutions and measures of health, educa-
tion and other public goods. The main caveat of this approach is that national factors
other than those specically controlled for, and in particular colonial and post-colonial
institutions, may be behind the uncovered statistical relationship. To address this issue
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) use ethnic groups as their unit of analysis, and
show how pre-colonial institutions have an e¤ect on present-day economic development
even after controlling for national characteristics with the use of country xed e¤ects. In
subsequent work, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) also show how African national
institutions, that is, institutions put in place by colonial and post-colonial forces, actually
exert little or no inuence in areas far away from the capital city - a result that further
emphasizes the importance of pre-colonial factors.
This Chapter contributes to the literature by analysing the role of pre-colonial insti-
tutions on present-day socioeconomic outcomes for Latin America. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the rst attempt of this kind for the Latin American case. Because
controlling for colonial and post-colonial institutions by means of country xed e¤ects is
an important requirement, I do not follow Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) in using the na-
tion as the unit of analysis. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) use ethnic groups as
their unit analysis which is possible in the Latin American case but comes with its own
methodological challenges -as we will see in the next Chapter. For this Chapter, instead,
I take as my unit of analysis the largest administrative divisions of each country below
the national level, which I refer to as "states"2. Of course, these states are ethnically
diverse; but data on the share of the di¤erent ethnic groups within them is available. The
data thus covers 324 states from 17 Latin American countries, and allows for the use of
country-specic xed e¤ects. Among this cross-section of states I uncover a robust and
statistically signicant relationship between pre-colonial institutions and present-day mea-
sures of education, health, and economic development. The relationship remains in place
after controlling for each states geographic characteristics and a battery of alternative
colonial and pre-colonial determinants of economic success.
Besides the above references, the present Chapter is also related to a rapidly developing
empirical literature using data at the sub-national level to shed new light on questions of
growth and development (Acemoglu and Dell 2010; Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes,
and Shleifer 2014). Within this literature, of special relevance to us is the work of Bruhn
2The actual name given to these administrative divisions changes from country to country: provincias
in Argentina, departamentos in Bolivia, regiones in Chile, estados in Mexico, and so on.
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and Gallego (2012), who not only focus on Latin America but also consider the e¤ect of
di¤erent colonial economic activities, like mining or plantation agriculture. This o¤ers
a relevant set of controls for my study, as I seek to factor out pre-colonial inuences
from colonial ones. A second paper of relevance to my study is Maloney and Valencia
(2015), who show there is persistance of economic success at the subnational level in the
Americas. Since much of this persistance is due to the fact that colonial settlements were
often established near pre-colonial population centres, the work of Maloney and Valencia
cannot assess the role of pre-colonial institutions on economic development - precisely the
point of the present chapter. Finally, the Chapter also relates to a literature stressing
the deep historical roots of long-run development. Within this literature, the evidence
presented by Bockstette et al. (2002) and Comin et al. (2010) suggests that factors such
as early state formation and technological advancement may determine future trajectories
of economic development for us as much as two or three millennia.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 o¤ers some historical
background in order to place the research question in its context. In particular, it makes
the case for pre-colonial institutions having an inuence up to our days in Latin America.
Section 2.3 discusses the data and presents the empirical methodology. Section 2.4 presents
the baseline results and extends into a number of additional tests and robustness checks.
Section 2.5, nally, o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2.2 Historical overview and main hypothesis
On the face of it, it is perhaps understandable that the research e¤ort on the role of
pre-colonial institutions has so far ignored the case of Latin America. Indeed, there is
little doubt that colonialism cut much deeper in Latin America than in Africa -or almost
any other region in the world for that matter. It is not just that colonialism lasted far
longer, about three centuries for most Latin American nations and even longer for a few
Caribbean ones. More important, only in the Americas and in some of the Pacic islands
did the European conquest lead to a radical transformation of the ethnic structure of the
population. Su¤ering the consequences of a new disease environment, the aboriginal pop-
ulation of the Americas (henceforth Amerindians) was decimated over the hundred years
or so following rst contact with Europeans. In its place, a society of European descen-
dants, mixed-race mestizos, Amerindians and Africans, these last ones brought as slave
labour, took over. Europeans moved to the Americas permanently, and their descendants
constitute the economic and political elite of most Latin American nations to this day.
Under these circumstances, one would be excused to think that Latin America con-
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stitutes a prime example of how colonial factors determine institutional structures to the
detriment of everything else. Only in the Americas we can observe colonialism wiping out
not only the established institutional order but even the very people who held that order.
The rupture from the pre-colonial world was radical, the chances for pre-colonial factors
to survive into the present-day appear, at rst sight, very limited.
And yet, things start to look di¤erent under closer inspection. While Amerindians
remained at the fringes of the economic and political power structures, they played a
crucial role as the main source of labour, and therefore principal factor of production,
in two of the most important sectors of the colonial economy: mining and agricultural
production for the local market3. Amerindian labour was the main source of wealth for
Spanish settlers in the Americas, as best summarized by the aphorism "Sin Indios no
hay Indias" ("Without Indians there is no Indies") - attributed to 16th century Spanish
settlers when defending the granting of rights over Indian labour against accusations by
the Crown of excessive exploitation.
The extraction of this Amerindian labour relied on the use of aboriginal structures of
power and organization. While the growing class of mestizos lived in towns and cities
and collaborated closely with the Spanish elites, Amerindians by and large retired to
their rural communities where they lived a separate cultural life from the rest of society.
Spanish governors referred to this network of Indian villages, where no Europeans lived
permanently, as the "Republic of Indians" - a name that reveals much about the degree
of autonomy granted to these communities in their internal a¤airs. Indian villages were
compelled to pay taxes and supply tribute in the form of labour for mining, public works
and, during the early phase of the colony, agricultural production through a number of
schemes such as the encomienda, repartimiento or mita. The delivery of labour and taxes
was organized by local headmen and leaders, who enjoyed privileges such as the private
ownership of land and exception from taxation. In this way, as James Lang put it, "The
Spanish enterprise in the New World rested on an indigenous social order" (Lang 1975,
p. 7).
After bottoming out in the early to mid-17th century, Amerindian populations started
to recover all along the continent from the early 18th century onwards (Burkholder and
Johnson 1998, pp. 107-110). The rise of the large agricultural estate (hacienda) during
the late colonial period and through the 19th century meant that many Amerindians
left their communities to nd permanent work (and often debt bondage) in them. On
the other hand, the 20th century brought a number of revolutionary movements and
3Agricultural production for the export market, with crops such as sugar cane, tobacco and cotton,
employed African slave labour. See Angeles (2013) for an analysis of the factors determining the ow of
slaves to the Americas.
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left-leaning governments which aimed at redistributing land and in so doing reversed
the ow of Amerindians out of their communities (most notably the Mexican revolution
of 1910 and the Bolivian revolution of 1952). These ups and downs notwithstanding,
during ve centuries of colonial and post-colonial history the Amerindian rural community
has remained a permanent element of Latin American countries. Its existence ensured
the preservation of Amerindian languages, cultural characteristics and many institutional
elements up to the present day.
The above historical overview applies to most Amerindian groups throughout the
Americas - only the most remote groups such as the tropical forest dwellers of the Amazon
managed to remain outside the inuence of Europeans well into the 20th century. Within
this large universe of Amerindian cultures, large institutional di¤erences were in place.
At the time of rst contact with Europeans, Amerindian groups varied greatly in terms
of political structure and institutional complexity: from the multi-layered bureaucracy
administering the vast Inca Empire to the numerous small chiefdoms with no political
organization beyond the village level, passing through intermediate forms of political com-
plexity such as the confederacies of villages and city-states of Mesoamerica.
The central hypothesis of the present chapter and the doctoral thesis as a wholeis
that these institutional di¤erences, preserved throughout the colonial period in Amerindian
rural communities, continue to exert an inuence on socioeconomic development up to this
day. As has been shown for the case of Africa, I hypothesize that higher levels of pre-
colonial institutional development are associated with better outcomes in areas such as
education, health, and economic well-being. Several mechanisms have been advanced to
explain this link in the literature. In the context of Latin America, I would emphasize the
following ones:
i) Ethnic groups with experience of large-scale political organization were in a
better position to ensure the delivery of locally-produced public goods such as education
and public health. They would also have local forms of legal resolution that did not involve
colonial or national courts (and would for that reason be more e¢ cient).
ii) Institutionally-advanced groups found it easier to learn new techniques and
modes of production, and to integrate themselves into the colonial and post-colonial eco-
nomic system. For instance, experience with markets was much more prevalent among
Aztecs and Incas than among peoples of the Amazon.
iii) Institutionally-advanced groups were able to organize themselves and defend
their interests, including claims to land and other resources, in front of colonial and post-
colonial governments.
iv) A higher level of pre-colonial institutional development may result in more
accountability of local chiefs, in particular if some forms of political organization survived
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beyond the village level which would hold village leaders accountable towards their ethnic
nations. This mechanism is emphasized by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) for the case of
Africa.
The above explanations have in common that they all describe a positive link between
the pre-colonial institutions of an ethnic group and the subsequent socioeconomic success of
that same group. In addition to them I may also hypothesize that pre-colonial institutions
could benet the non-Amerindian population as well. This is of particular importance
for Latin America, where the dominant ethnic group in most regions is the mestizo -
people with mixed Amerindian and European ancestry. While mestizos clearly function
within the institutional setting put in place by the colonial and post-colonial state, pre-
colonial institutions may exert some inuence on their beliefs, cultural practices, and
ability to cooperate with ethnic groups of European origin. In this way, the inuence of
pre-colonial institutions may be felt across all the inhabitants of any given state, and not
just Amerindians.
2.3 Data and methodology
I follow Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) in using
Murdocks (1967) index of "Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the local community level" as
our measure of pre-colonial institutional complexity. The variable takes discrete values
between 0 and 4, where the value represents the number of levels of political organization
above the local community. Murdock assigns a value of 0 to groups organized in bands or
single-village tribes, a value of 1 to chiefdoms comprising a few villages or a single city-
state, and a value of 2 for large chiefdoms with many cities or confederacies of city-states.
Values 3 and 4 are reserved for states with several levels of intermediate bureaucracy
between its ruler and the local community (provinces, municipalities and so on). These
categories are somewhat related to the standard classication of political complexity in
anthropological studies, as rst formulated by Elman Service, which classies societies
into bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states (Service 1971). As discussed by Diamond (1997),
the level of political complexity is closely related to technological advancement, which is
needed in order to support an ever larger class of non-food producers.
For the Americas, the only pre-colonial group that achieves the maximum value of
4 in Murdocks classication is the Incas. Indeed, the Inca Empire is well-recognized
as the most sophisticated political and administrative structure developed in the Western
Hemisphere before the European conquest (Burkholder and Johnson 1998, p. 19)4. Perhaps
4I also assign the value of 4 to the Aymaras, a large Amerindian group which was part of the Inca
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surprisingly, the Aztec Empire of central Mexico, the only pre-colonial state comparable
to the Inca Empire in terms of extension and population, is only assigned a value of 2.
This, arguably, is due to the Aztecs political organization, which has been described as
hegemonic or indirect. Kingdoms conquered by the Aztecs remained independent in all
internal a¤airs, their rulers were typically not removed, and representatives of the Aztec
Emperor, such as provincial governors, were largely absent. I follow Murdocks choice and
use a value of 2 for the Aztec ethnic group through most of the paper; but I also subject
the results to a robustness check where the Aztec group is assigned the maximum value of
4. Most other Amerindian groups are assigned a value of 0 or 1 in Murdocks scale5, with
the exception of a few groups organized in confederacies of city-states such as the Muisca
of central Colombia or the Zapotecs of southern Mexico.
I combine the above variable with data on the ethnic structure of the population for
each sub-national state in Latin America to construct a population-weighted average of
Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index for all states. The variable, which takes non-
integer values between 0 and 4, is constructed using only the population and institutional
data for Amerindian ethnic groups, and as such reects the average level of institutional
complexity among the Amerindian population residing in each state6.
It is worth pointing out that the construction of this measure of pre-colonial institutions
requires the matching of ethnic groups listed under two di¤erent datasets. Indeed, the data
on population shares comes from national censuses - which I accessed individually through
each nations statistical agency. While a majority of ethnic groups receive the same name
in the national censuses and in the Ethnographic Atlas, there are a number of cases where
the names assigned in these two sources di¤er. I used a diversity of additional material
empire and who were not assigned a value of Jurisdictional Hierarchy in Murdock (1967). My results are
not dependent on this choice.
5Please note that none of the ethnic groups in Latin America, as recorded by the Atlas, take a value of
3 of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index. Though, as emphasized previously, level and 3 and 4 are
reserved to ethnic groups that were part of large states with several levels of intermediate bureaucracy
between its ruler and the local community. Yet even that there are not ethnic groups with this level of
institutional complexity, the construction of our index is still feasible since, as I will explain below, by
using the population-weighted average of such index, its resulting values will therefore be capturing the
average level of institutional complexity among all the Amerindian population living in each state, which
will be taking non-integer values between 0 and 4.
6More explicitly, I construct a population-weighted average of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index
for all ethnic groups living in each state by using the following formula:
PCIs;c =
P
e
Amee;s;c
Ames;c
 JHe;
where PCI is our the state-level measure of my pre-colonial institution index in state s of country c.
Amee;s;c represents the total number of Amerindians of ethnic group e living in state s of country c.
Ames;c denotes the total number of Amerindians living in states s of country c Finally, JHe denotes the
respective level of institutional complexity of ethnic group e based on Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy
index.
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in order to make sure that as many ethnic groups as possible were matched - please refer
to Table A.1 in the Appendix A for details. By this procedure I am able to match 102
Amerindian ethnic groups from the census data to the Atlas.
It is important to note as well that the data uses the most recent census available
for each country, as previous versions would have a less comprehensive coverage of the
Amerindian population (for instance not recording the exact ethnic group). It is worth
mentioning that the percentage of Amerindians in the total population may change signi-
cantly between two censuses, as census questions are modied and social attitudes towards
Amerindians evolve. While I cannot say much about how the results would be a¤ected if
di¤erent census years were used, I did try using two di¤erent censuses for Bolivia (2001
and 2012) as the data was su¢ ciently detailed in both cases. My results were similar in
both cases.
These 102 Amerindian groups for which a value of the index of Jurisdictional Hierarchy
could be assigned represent 71% of the total Amerindian population of Latin America -
albeit this percentage varies signicantly from country to country. The fact that almost
30% of the Amerindian population could not be matched is to be expected given that the
Ethnographic Atlas does not o¤er an exhaustive list of all groups but rather a survey of
the groups for which anthropological work is available. For the Amerindian groups that
could not be matched, I assign the minimum value of Jurisdictional Hierarchy under the
assumption that small and less organized groups were more likely to remain unresearched
by anthropologists. The assumption is supported by the fact that all groups present in
the Atlas with a value of Jurisdictional Hierarchy equal to 1 or higher were matched to
the census data. As a robustness check, I also experiment assigning non-matched groups
a value equal to the average of all matched groups within the same state.
Figure 2.1 presents a visual overview of my measure of pre-colonial institutions across
all subnational states in continental Latin America. The contours of the Inca and Aztec
Empire are in evidence, as are the relatively advanced areas of the Yucatan peninsula and
Central Colombia.
With the measure of pre-colonial institutions at hand, I investigate its inuence on
present-day socioeconomic outcomes in Latin America using the following econometric
specication:
Ys;c = c + PCIs;c + Amepops;c + Xs;c + "e;c (1)
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.Figure 2.1: Pre-Colonial Institutions in Latin America
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In equation (1), Ys;c is an outcome variable such as a measure of schooling, health or
economic well-being. Subscript c denotes subnational states, subscript s denotes coun-
tries, and c is a set of country-specic xed e¤ects. PCIs;c is the measure of pre-colonial
institutions described above and Xs;c is a set of variables controlling for state character-
istics such as population density, geography, and a number of colonial and pre-colonial
factors potentially a¤ecting socioeconomic outcomes. Finally, Amepops;c is the share of
Amerindians in the total population of the state, a control variable that I single out for
its importance.
Indeed, the share of Amerindians in the total population matters as Amerindians have
traditionally su¤ered from ethnic discrimination, may experience di¢ culty integrating into
a dominant non-Amerindian society (for example, because formal education may not be
provided in their native language), and tend to be given a low priority by the national
government. Under such circumstances, it should not be surprising that regions with a
larger Amerindian population tend to be characterized by lower levels of socioeconomic
outcomes (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) for a detailed analysis of this issue).
Controlling for the share of Amerindians in the total population is important as in-
stitutional development typically went hand in hand with population density in the pre-
industrial world. Thus, areas with more advanced pre-colonial institutions would also be
areas with a larger Amerindian population, and therefore a larger share of Amerindians in
the total population today. The positive e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions that I hypothe-
size would be biased downwards if I do not control for the fact that more advanced areas
will also tend to su¤er more from discrimination towards Amerindians.
It is also worth pointing out that, given the nature of Murdocks dataset, the variable
PCIs;c may su¤er from measurement error. This, however, would only result in a bias
towards zero in the estimates of coe¢ cient . As most of the results rely on  being
di¤erent from zero, I may say that conclusions would be stronger if this variable could be
measured with more precision.
All our regressions include country xed e¤ects as these control for a wealth of char-
acteristics shared by all states within the same nation. In particular, a number of colonial
and post-colonial institutional factors will be common to all subnational units, such as
the written laws and the constitution, the organization of public health and education,
the balance of power between the di¤erent branches of the government, and so on. As I
search to isolate the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions, accounting for as many colonial and
post-colonial institutional factors as possible is important. Of course, it may still be the
case that some of these factors display variability at the subnational level: some aspects
of the law, for instance, may be applied more stringently in the capital city as compared
18
to far-o¤ provinces. I cannot control directly for such e¤ects, but note that if the way
in which national institutions such as legal codes apply locally correlates with the local
level of pre-colonial institutions, a potential explanation may be that more advanced pre-
colonial institutions facilitate the operation of national law. In that case, the regressions
would simply be capturing an additional indirect e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions, one
that works via a more e¤ective functioning of the post-colonial state.
I will consider as dependent variables three indicators of education (percent of the
population who completed primary education, percent who completed secondary educa-
tion, average years of schooling), one indicator of public health (infant mortality rate),
two indicators of economic well-being (percent of the population with access to drinking
water, percent with access to electricity), and two indicators of overall economic develop-
ment (GDP per capita and poverty rates)7.. The battery of control variables at the state
level will be discussed in the following section, as they are progressively introduced. The
sources and precise denitions of all variables used in the paper can be found in Table A.2
in the Appendix A.
Before turning to our formal statistical analysis, Tables 2.1 to 2.2 o¤er an overview of
the data. Table 2.1 lists all countries in the dataset together with their total population,
the percentage of Amerindians in their population, and the percentage of their Amerindian
population being matched to the Ethnographic Atlas. The data covers all countries in
continental Latin American - a total of 17 countries and 324 subnational states.
It is worth pointing out that for Brazil the population shares of di¤erent Amerindian
groups is only available at the level of regions (groups of 3 to 9 states). I assign to each
Brazilian state the population shares of the region it belongs to. For Argentina the data
is available at the state level but gives only a partial breakdown, with the population of
only the main Amerindian groups of each state given. I complete the missing data for
Argentina using national totals for each group and assumptions about the distribution of
each group outside the states where they are most numerous. For Uruguay I do not have
data on di¤erent Amerindian groups, only the population share of all Amerindians in each
state. This, however, is not a problem for the construction of my measure of Pre-Colonial
Institutions for Uruguay as we know that all Amerindian groups in Uruguay have a value
of zero of Jurisdictional Hierarchy. For all other 14 countries I have a complete dataset
giving population shares for all Amerindian groups in every state.
7Please note that, unless otherwise specied, most of the data for my dependent variables
uses the most recent census available for each country. The time of each census varies, yet
it ranges between 2002 and 2012. To nd out the specic year of each census, please go to
http://redatam.org/redbin/RpWebEngine.exe/Portal?lang=eng
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Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, while
Table 2.3 reports all bivariate correlations between our measure of pre-colonial institutions,
the share of Amerindians in the total population, and all the outcome variables. I note
that the correlation between pre-colonial institutions and the share of Amerindians in the
population is positive but not that high (0.35) - proof that these two variables are not
measuring the same phenomena. I may also note that while the share of Amerindians
is negatively related to all our measures of socioeconomic success (negative correlations
except for infant mortality and poverty rates, where higher values denote worse outcomes),
this is by far not the case for pre-colonial institutions. The bivariate relationship between
pre-colonial institutions and socioeconomic outcomes can be mildly positive, as reported
in Table 2.3.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Baseline results
I begin the statistical analysis with a set of baseline regressions reported in Table 2.4. All
regressions include country xed e¤ects and control variables are added progressively in or-
der to appreciate their e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of interest. The dependent variable I select
for this initial analysis is the percentage of the population who nished secondary school-
ing, in logarithmic form8. Standard errors are clustered at the country level throughout
the chapter.
The rst column of Table 2.4 reports the most simple regression where only the mea-
sure of pre-colonial institutions is included alongside xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on
pre-colonial institutions is already statistically signicant at the 5% level and takes a
value of 0.0378. The coe¢ cients magnitude doubles to 0.0894 and its statistical signi-
cance increases to 1% in the second column, where the share of Amerindians in the total
population of each state is added. As expected, this last variable has a strong negative
inuence on the outcome measure and its absence was responsible for a negative bias in
the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions. We are thus conrming previous research as to the
overall poorer socioeconomic outcomes of the Amerindian population, but adding a new
result whereby areas where Amerindians groups were characterized by higher pre-colonial
institutional quality have better outcomes.
8Please note that the reason to use secondary education as dependent variable in table 2.4 is mainly to
illustrate how the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions changes (or remains unchanged) as additional controls
are added. I have run the set of regressions in table 2.4 for each of the eight dependent variables at
my disposal and results are similar. In short, education is regarded as one among several indicators of
socioeconomic development -and not our main channel of interest.
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Table 2.4: Baseline results
Dependent variable: Percent of population having completed Secondary education (in logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0378** 0.0894*** 0.0751*** 0.0846*** 0.0877*** 0.0841***
[0.0148] [0.0214] [0.0237] [0.0238] [0.0223] [0.0220]
Share of Amerindian population -0.746*** -0.632** -0.583** -0.594** -0.578**
[0.192] [0.222] [0.234] [0.230] [0.231]
Log population density 0.0279** 0.0299** 0.0493*** 0.0541***
[0.0105] [0.0135] [0.0151] [0.0118]
Latitude 0.00954** 0.0107*** 0.0105***
[0.00344] [0.00315] [0.00305]
Malaria Stability Index -0.0117 -0.0159 -0.0146
[0.0155] [0.0139] [0.0132]
Temperature (Celsius) 0.00284 -2.41e-05 0.00110
[0.00559] [0.00524] [0.00505]
Altitude (km.) -0.0359** -0.0341* -0.0359*
[0.0154] [0.0171] [0.0189]
Land area (sq. km.) 5.45e-08 3.49e-08
[9.63e-08] [9.35e-08]
Landlocked dummy -0.0652 -0.0582
[0.0552] [0.0528]
Distance to capital (km.) 7.83e-05** 6.67e-05
[2.79e-05] [3.87e-05]
Inverse distance to coast -0.895*** -0.855**
[0.306] [0.308]
Land Suitability Index -0.0695
[0.126]
Oil & Gas dummy 0.0132
[0.0293]
Gold & Silver dummy 0.0530
[0.0436]
Other mines dummy 0.00345
[0.0320]
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 324 324 324 317 317 317
Adjusted R-squared 0.703 0.767 0.775 0.781 0.789 0.788
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The next four columns of Table 2.4 add a large number of state-specic characteristics
which may have an e¤ect on socioeconomic outcomes and whose absence could create an
omitted variable bias. In column 3, I control for the present-day population density of each
state - as the provision of education may be more costly in less densely settled territories.
As expected, areas of higher population density tend to have better outcomes, but the
e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions continues to be large and statistically signicant. It is
important to note that present-day population density may be potentially be considered
as a bad controlas pointed out by my priors Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013).
For the case of Latin America, while it is true that European colonizers often settled in
the areas of high pre-colonial development, subsequent historical events (especially post-
independence) meant that regions where no advanced pre-colonial group existed became
highly populated. A few examples are the regions around the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio
de Janeiro, Buenos Aires or Santiago: among the richest and most densely populated in
Latin America yet our index of pre-colonial development is essentially zero for all of them.
Yet I have experimented dropping this variable from our control set and the coe¢ cients
of interest are essentially unchanged. I am therefore quite condent that bad controls are
not biasing our results.
Columns 4 to 6 deal with the important issue of geography, including aspects such as
climate, location and natural resources. It is natural to think that more advanced pre-
colonial groups would have displaced rivals and established themselves in regions charac-
terized by more fertile land, better access to rivers, a milder climate, etc. If that was the
case, their present-day advantage may be due to those geographic factors, and not to their
superior institutions. In addition to this, and working in the same direction, less advanced
groups would have been less able to resist losing their land and other resources when the
colonial conquest reached their territory.
With this in mind, column 4 augments the baseline regression with four indicators of
climate: latitude, altitude, temperature, and an index of Malaria prevalence (higher values
denote higher incidence). Column 5 includes the area of the state in question plus three
indicators of its locational advantage: distance to the capital, distance to the sea, and a
dummy for landlocked states. Column 6, nally, directly measures the most important
forms of natural resource wealth by adding an index of land suitability for agriculture and
dummy variables indicating the presence of oil or gas elds, gold or silver mines, and any
other mines.
The main result of these three columns is that the coe¢ cient on pre-colonial institutions
remains statistically signicant at the 1% level in all cases and its magnitude is not much
a¤ected. In column 6, when all controls are included, the coe¢ cient takes a value of 0.0841.
As the dependent variable is measured in logarithmic form, this coe¢ cient indicates that
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an increase in the average level of pre-colonial institutions by 1 unit is associated with an
increase in secondary school achievement of around 8%. This is a large e¤ect when we
consider an average value of secondary school achievement across all states of 41% with a
standard deviation of 15% - passing from a pre-colonial population of tribesmen to one of
multi-city chiefdoms (increase of 2 units) would lead to a one standard deviation change
in secondary schooling.
Turning to our state-specic indicators of geographic advantage, latitude, altitude,
distance to the capital and distance to the sea all appear to have a statistically signicant
relationship with the outcome variable. Latitude and altitude seem to pick up the e¤ect
of all climatic factors, as neither malaria prevalence nor temperature are statistically
signicant in their presence. Somewhat surprisingly, distance to the capital is positively
related to education while being landlocked appears to carry no additional penalty once
distance to the coast has been accounted for. Finally, none of the four indicators of natural
resource wealth exerts a statistically signicant e¤ect on secondary school achievement.
Arguably, the gains from having these resources at hand are counteracted by opposite
e¤ects much discussed in the natural resource curseliterature.
The results of Table 2.4 may be reproduced over the full array of socioeconomic indi-
cators, as shown in Table 2.5. This Table takes as its baseline the regression reported in
the last column of Table 2.4, with all state characteristics considered so far, and considers
as dependent variable each of the eight outcome measures at my disposal. Remarkably,
the index of pre-colonial institutions is consistently related with better outcomes for all of
them: it is positively related with measures of education, drinking water, electricity and
GDP per capita, and negatively related with infant mortality and poverty rates. In all
cases the relationship is statistically signicant at the 5% level or better.
The e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions is not only statistically signicant, the magnitude
of the e¤ect is also large. Since all dependent variables are used in logarithmic form,
coe¢ cients may be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Interestingly, the largest e¤ects
are observed for our measures of overall economic development. A 1-unit increase in the
index of pre-colonial institutions is associated with a 20% increase in GDP per capita and
a 12% decrease in the poverty rate. The e¤ects for all other dependent variables are in
the 3 to 8% range for a 1-unit increase, in all cases a sizeable change.
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2.4.2 Controlling for colonial activities
While the results so far control for institutional factors which are constant at the national
level and for a vast array of geographic characteristics, other historical factors not yet
considered could be a source of bias. In particular, pre-colonial institutional development
may be related to the colonial activities put in place following the conquest. Indeed, the
territories of the most advanced pre-colonial civilizations - central and southern Mexico,
the Andes - were also the source of most Amerindian labour. The availability of this
labour made possible a range of economic activities during the colony, most notably silver
mining and the agricultural latifundia. If these activities then have an e¤ect on present-day
outcomes, pre-colonial institutions would be correlated with socioeconomic development
but the causal mechanism would work through the colonizing process.
To test for this alternative explanation I take advantage of the work of Bruhn and
Gallego (2012), who investigate the role of colonial activities on economic development in
Latin America using states as the unit of analysis. They classify states into four mutually
exclusive groups according to the main economic activity taking place in their territory
during the colonial period. These four groups are:
a) Mining. In particular the gold mines of Brazil, the silver mines of Mexico,
Peru and Bolivia, and the associated mines producing mercury for the process of silver
extraction through amalgamation.
b) Plantations. Places dedicated to the cultivation of high-value cash crops for the
export market, in particular sugar, tobacco and cotton. Plantations relied essentially on
slave labour.
c) Other colonial activities. Places where the dominant economic activity was
agricultural production for the local market (from Amerindian lands or from latifundia)
and industry.
d) No colonial activities. Places where the colonial state had marginal or no inu-
ence, like remote parts of the Amazonian rainforest and the extreme south of Argentina
and Chile.
It is important to note that Bruhn and Gallego (2012) dont use these four groups in
their analysis. Instead, they combine the information on the type of economic activity in
each state with data on pre- colonial population density to produce a classication into
three types of colonial activities which they refer to as "bad", "good" and "ugly". I dont
follow their approach as it incorporates value judgements as to what is believed to be
"good" or "bad" (let alone "ugly"). The classication of colonial activities into mining,
plantations, and others is much less likely to be a¤ected by our own beliefs.
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I incorporate dummy variables for the rst three types of economic activities, leaving
the case of no colonial activities as our excluded category. Results are reported in Table
2.6, where all regressions include country xed e¤ects and our full range of baseline control
variables9.
Table 2.6 is strongly supportive of our thesis. Indeed, the measure of pre-colonial
institutions continues to have a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on the eight
dependent variables I consider. The size of the coe¢ cients is not much a¤ected with respect
to Table 2.5, only the e¤ects on educational achievement and electricity provision are
somewhat reduced. This indicates that the relationship between pre-colonial institutional
development and present-day outcomes is largely not mediated by the type of economic
activity put in place during the colony.
Turning to the e¤ects of colonial activities on present-day outcomes, Table 2.6 gives
us a mixed picture. The e¤ect seems clearest on overall measures of economic develop-
ment, as states associated with mining and plantation agriculture have lower levels of
GDP per capita than states left untouched by the colonial economy. This is in line with
Bruhn and Gallego (2012), who based most of their analysis on the e¤ects on GDP per
capita. For other measures of socioeconomic development, however, the evidence is less
conclusive. Areas where slave-based plantations were located are indeed characterized by
lower secondary education and less access to drinking water, albeit the relationship only
marginally achieves statistical signicance. But no further statistically signicant e¤ects
are estimated for areas formerly dedicated to mining or other colonial activities. Overall,
while colonial activities may well play a role in determining current development outcomes,
the results show that their consideration does not diminish the importance of pre-colonial
institutions.
9Please note that this set of controls on colonial activities may also be regarded as "bad controls". I
am sensitive to this potential problem but do not believe it concerns most of the variables on colonial
activities. A bad controlis a variable which is itself an outcome of the regressor of interest (in this case
pre-colonial institutions). This is poorly applied to the two most important types of colonial activities,
plantation agriculture and mining. Plantation agriculture was largely determined by climate conditions,
like the suitability to grow sugarcane, while mining was largely determined by the existence of mine elds.
On the other hand, I would agree that the dummy for other colonial activities, which includes industry,
may plausibly be regarded as a bad control. I have experimented dropping this variable from our control
set and the coe¢ cients of interest are essentially unchanged. As with my control on current population
density, I am quite condent that bad controls are not biasing my results.
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2.4.3 Controlling for other pre-colonial characteristics
If the results so far clearly point towards a persistent role of pre-colonial institutions on
current socioeconomic development, one may still argue that pre-colonial features other
than institutional complexity may explain the results. As I mentioned briey, institutional
complexity usually correlates with economic development, and it is possible that richer
pre-colonial societies were able to adapt better and take advantage of the new colonial
environment simply because of their wealth. Furthermore, the Ethnographic Atlas pro-
vides a large array of cultural and economic practices of the societies it surveys. I am
therefore in a position to control for a number of pre-colonial characteristics other than
the complexity of their political structure - and I do so in what follows.
I start with overall economic development in pre-colonial times. Clearly, measures of
income per head are not available for this time period in the Americas, but I may follow
much of the relevant literature and rely on estimates of population density as a proxy
for overall economic development (see, for instance, Acemoglu et al. 2002). The data on
pre-colonial population density at the state level comes from Bruhn and Gallego (2012),
and Table 2.7 adds this variable as an additional control to the regressions reported in
Table 2.6.
Once again, the results are fully consistent with the thesis of the present Chapter. The
coe¢ cient of pre-colonial institutions is hardly a¤ected by the inclusion of this variable
and remains statistically signicant for all dependent variables. Perhaps surprisingly, pre-
colonial population density has a statistically signicant e¤ect on only one of the eight
dependent variables I consider - GDP per capita. This suggests that whatever e¤ect
pre-colonial economic development may have on present-day socioeconomic outcomes, the
transmission mechanism works mainly through institutional persistence. I also note that
I nd a negative e¤ect of pre-colonial population density on GDP per capita, as in the
"reversals of fortune" thesis by Acemoglu et al. (2002). For alternative views on the
reversals of fortune thesis in the Americas see Chanda et al. (2014) and Maloney and
Valencia (2015).
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In Table 2.8, I take an additional step and control for nine social and economic char-
acteristics of pre-colonial societies other than their institutional complexity. These char-
acteristics are the fraction of the population dedicated to gathering, hunting, shing and
agriculture; their typical pattern of settlement (from fully nomadic to compact and per-
manent settlements); their degree of class stratication; a dummy for the existence of
slavery; a dummy for the existence of elections in determining leader succession and, -
nally, a dummy for the existence of inheritance rules for property (see Table A.3 in the
Appendix A for detailed denitions). For each of them, I proceed as for the measure of pre-
colonial institutions: I calculate the population-weighted average among all Amerindian
groups present in the state10. The rst four measures, all relating to the economic activity
of the population, are included simultaneously in column 2.11. All other variables are
included separately in the remaining columns of the Table. The regressions also control
for the di¤erent colonial activities as in Table 2.6 and for pre-colonial population density
as in Table 2.7, besides all the state-specic characteristics and country xed e¤ects that
have been included all along. The dependent variable is the percentage of the population
with secondary education.
As Table 2.8 makes clear, the inclusion of these additional pre-colonial characteris-
tics does not challenge the importance of pre-colonial institutions. In all regressions the
coe¢ cient on the measure of pre-colonial institutions remains positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is remarkably consistent,
uctuating closely around the value of 0.0700 in all but one case (column 2, where the
coe¢ cient equals 0.0963). Thus, the coe¢ cient is usually very similar to what is obtained
before any of these additional pre-colonial characteristics is controlled for (rst column of
Table 2.8). In most cases, the additional pre-colonial characteristics considered turn out
to have no statistically signicant e¤ect on education. This reinforces the thesis, which
regards institutional complexity as the crucial aspect of pre-colonial societies a¤ecting
current outcomes.
The exercise of Table 2.8 may be reproduced using the other seven dependent variables
considered previously. While I do not report these results for conciseness, I have carried
them out and the importance of pre-colonial institutions is never challenged. The sign and
statistical signicance of pre-colonial institutions carries through for all seven alternative
outcome variables and in essentially all specications considered in Table 2.8.
10For the Amerindian groups that could not be matched to the Atlas I assign a value equal to the
average value of all other groups within the state. This is di¤erent from what I did for my measure of
pre-colonial institutions, as the variables considered here are not necessarily related to social complexity,
and could not be assumed to take the lowest possible value. Uruguay is excluded from table 2.8 as I don.t
have enough data to calculate these additional variables for it.
11These four variables do not sum up to 1, as a fraction of the population may be counted in more than
one of them, and sometimes in none of them.
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Table 2.8: Controlling for pre-colonial characteristics: socioeco-
nomic factors
Dependent variable: Percent of population having completed Secondary education (in logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0705*** 0.0963*** 0.0712*** 0.0719** 0.0705*** 0.0718*** 0.0715***
[0.0188] [0.0193] [0.0190] [0.0249] [0.0188] [0.0201] [0.0208]
Pre-colonial population density -0.0231 -0.0210 -0.0237 -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0244 -0.0230
[0.0139] [0.0120] [0.0139] [0.0138] [0.0139] [0.0138] [0.0138]
Other colonial activities -0.0360 -0.0455 -0.0387 -0.0367 -0.0357 -0.0380 -0.0367
[0.0359] [0.0383] [0.0372] [0.0375] [0.0383] [0.0353] [0.0368]
Mining colonial activities 0.0139 0.00217 0.0140 0.0130 0.0143 0.0112 0.0135
[0.0561] [0.0501] [0.0554] [0.0520] [0.0616] [0.0543] [0.0568]
Plantation colonial activities -0.111 -0.111 -0.120 -0.112 -0.111 -0.115 -0.112
[0.0709] [0.0700] [0.0733] [0.0759] [0.0727] [0.0705] [0.0721]
Population employed in:
Gathering 0.0304
[0.489]
Hunting 0.424
[0.513]
Fishing 0.625**
[0.222]
Agriculture dependence -0.458***
[0.134]
Settlement pattern -0.0036
[0.00402]
Class Stratication -0.0025
[0.0237]
Slavery 0.0024
[0.0597]
Election -0.115
[0.0827]
Property rights -0.0209
[0.0570]
Controls included:
Share of ethnic population YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for geography, location
and natural resources YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261
Adjusted R-squared 0.810 0.821 0.810 0.809 0.809 0.811 0.810
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.4.4 Robustness checks
I have carried out a number of robustness checks on the above results, some of which I
have already referred to:
 I assigned to all non-matched Amerindian groups from our census data a value
of the index of Jurisdictional Hierarchy equal to the average value of all matched groups
within the state (instead of a value of 0).
 I assign the maximum value of 4 as the Jurisdictional Hierarchy of the Aztec
ethnic group.
 I exclude Brazil and Argentina from our regressions, as these two countries do
not have complete data on the ethnic composition of their population at the state level.
In all cases, the results carry through all these checks unchallenged with only minor
quantitative changes in the estimated coe¢ cients.
2.4.5 Comparing rural and urban regions
As a nal piece of evidence, I have gathered data allowing me to run separate regressions
for the rural and urban regions of Latin American at the level of subnational states. While
most of the data is not available at this level of disaggregation, I was able to nd separate
values for the rural and urban region of each state for four dependent variables (primary
education, secondary education, access to drinking water, access to electricity) and for
the ethnic composition of the population, which allows me to calculate the percentage of
Amerindians in the total population and to construct my measure of pre-colonial insti-
tutions. All other control variables may be used in the analysis, but their values do not
change between the rural and urban area of any given state. Argentina is omitted for
this exercise, as there is no information on the distribution of its Amerindian population
between urban and rural areas.
The interest of this exercise is that, in accordance with the discussion in section 2.2 of
this Chapter, the importance of pre-colonial institutions ought to be far more marked in
rural areas. Amerindians may be numerous in urban areas, but by migrating to them they
enter a process of cultural assimilation within the dominant mestizo society. Amerindians
no longer rely on their pre-colonial institutions once they leave their rural communities,
as a di¤erent set of institutional arrangements is imposed upon them. If my hypothesis is
correct, I should nd that the positive relationship between pre-colonial institutions and
socioeconomic development is stronger among rural areas.
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Table 2.9: Contrasting rural and urban areas
Dependent variable Primary education Secondary education Drinking water Electricity
rural urban rural urban rural urban rural urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0256** 0.0107** 0.0920*** 0.0340** 0.0846** 0.0370 0.128*** 0.00567
[0.0111] [0.00475] [0.0256] [0.0131] [0.0381] [0.0256] [0.0401] [0.00578]
Controls included:
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for geography, location
and natural resources YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 291 290 291 290 291 290 291 290
Adjusted R-squared 0.881 0.933 0.815 0.886 0.615 0.226 0.693 0.617
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Argentina has been removed from the sample for this table.
And indeed, the results clearly support this prior. Table 2.9 reproduces the regressions
of Table 2.5, where the set of control variables includes country xed e¤ects, population
density, and measures of climate, location and natural resources. I consider the four
dependent variables mentioned above, and for each case run separate regressions using all
rural areas or all urban areas. As it turns out, the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions is
positive and statistically signicant for the four cases covering rural areas, while only two
of the four cases covering urban areas reach statistical signicance. More important, the
coe¢ cient on pre-colonial institutions is always much larger for rural areas - between two
and three times larger in most cases12. As an example, it takes a value of 0.0920 for rural
areas when the dependent variable is secondary education as opposed to 0.0340 for the
corresponding regression using urban areas. I conclude that these results further solidify
the hypothesis of the present Chapter.
2.5 Concluding remarks
If one thing has been learned from the last two decades of research on economic develop-
ment over the very long run it is that the past cannot be easily cast aside. Every society
builds on the successes and mistakes of its predecessors, and inherits a set of rules and
institutions that are usually modied only gradually. While this seems obviously true
12To further test whether this di¤erence is statistically signicant between areas, I also experimented
developing an empirical strategy where both urban and rural areas are included together into a single
regression. I then interacted our index of pre-colonial institutions -as well as the set of controls- with
a dummy on areas -where rural areas will be equal to 1 and urban zero. Since our reference category
is urban areas, the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions in rural areas will be captured by the interaction
between the index of pre-colonial institutions and the dummy on areas. In all but one of the coe¢ cients of
this interaction are positive and statistically signicant. Results are reported in Table A.4 of Appendix
A.
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for the "winners" of economic history, the European nations that colonized the world, it
is also the case for the "losers", those nations being colonized. What came out of the
colonizing process throughout the world was not a mirror image of European society but
a new reality where pre-colonial culture and institutions survived, often below a layer of
o¢ cial or dominant culture. These two layers interact and modify each other, and both
of them ought to be considered in the study of todays developing countries.
The present Chapter brings support to the above assertions, and contributes to the
substantive evidence already in place for the case of Africa. As the empirical results show,
Latin American pre-colonial institutions - and more precisely the degree of political com-
plexity - are powerful predictors of present-day measures of socioeconomic development.
Several aspects render the evidence particularly convincing. First, the results are obtained
controlling for country xed e¤ects, thus factoring out many institutional factors playing
a role at the national level. Second, I introduce a large array of controls for geographic
factors including climate, location and the presence of natural resources. Third, I con-
sider additional historical forces such as the type of economic activity in place during the
colony and the economic and social prole of pre-colonial societies (besides their insti-
tutional complexity). Finally, I show how the inuence of pre-colonial institutions is far
stronger in rural areas, which is in accordance with the historical account I give for the
transmission of pre-colonial factors.
The present Chapter, together with the literature it contributes to, enhances our un-
derstanding of how developing countries got to where they are now. Understanding this
is important in its own right, but also increases the chances of making the right decisions
when considering where they head to in the future.
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Chapter 3
Pre-Colonial Institutions, Ethnic
Homelands, and Economic
Development in Latin America
Abstract
This Chapter studies the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on present-day
economic development in Latin America on the basis of the historical ethnic homelands.
The main hypothesis is that ethnic homelands inhabited by more advanced ethnic groups
-as measured by their levels of institutional complexity- relate to better economic devel-
opment today. To track these long-run e¤ects, I construct a new dataset by digitising
historiographical maps allowing me to pinpoint the geospatial location of ethnic home-
lands as of the XVI century. As a result, 375 ethnic homelands are created. I then capture
the levels of economic development at the ethnic homeland level by making use of alterna-
tive economic measures satellite light density data. After controlling for country-specic
characteristics and applying a large battery of geographical, locational, and historical fac-
tors, I found that the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions relate to a higher light density as
a proxy for economic activity- in ethnic homelands where more advanced ethnic groups
lived.
3.1 Introduction
Very little is known within the economic history literature about the role of ethnic groups
that lived before colonisation in the creation of wealth of the present-day Latin Americas
nations. Over the past decade, though, economists have placed enormous e¤orts in study-
ing the long-run e¤ects of ethnic-specic characteristics on todays economic development
(Fenske 2014; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011).
38
These studies, however, have mainly examined the African case and most of their
empirical examinations tend to be on the basis of the historical ethnic homelands. In-
terestingly, in searching for this link, the history of ethnic institutional advancements
appears as one of the most powerful ethnic features that can explain over the long-run the
di¤erences of economic development.
In the previous Chapter of the present thesis, I explored empirically the association
between the institutional complexity of ethnic groups and socioeconomic development
outcomes in Latin America. The main results of this Chapter is that subnational states
with a history of more advanced pre-colonial institutions relate to better levels of todays
socioeconomic development outcomes -principally through their e¤ects on the Amerindian
population.
While the previous Chapter already uncovered the positive e¤ects of pre-colonial in-
stitutions on present-day development in Latin America, the present Chapter addresses it
in a rather di¤erent empirical fashion. As noted before, Chapter 2 uses the contemporary
Latin American subnational states as the main unit of analysis, whereas in the present
Chapter my main unit is now the ethnic homeland. Yet, both empirical investigation still
allow me to include country xed e¤ects as a relevant method to reduce identication
problems arising from historical shocks, cultural adaptations, or colonial and post-colonial
institutions.
Thus, the main goal of this study is to empirically explore the link between pre-colonial
institutions and contemporary development in Latin America through the e¤ects of the
historical ethnic homelands. To uncover this association, I construct a new dataset drawn
from the series of Peter G. Murdocks historiographical publications of maps (1951, 1975)
portraying the locations of ethnic homelands in Latin America as of the XVI century. I
do so by digitising these maps allowing me to pinpoint the geospatial location of ethnic
homelands in this region.
Using ethnic homelands as the main unit of analysis in the present empirical investi-
gation may o¤er some methodological advantages and di¤erences over the method applied
in Chapter 2. First, the current study uses geospatial data on satellite light density at
night as an alternative measure of economic development at this novel unit of analysis. It
is worth pointing out that this unconvential measure of economic development is widely
used in the existing literature addressing the long-run development; and the main idea for
this is to overcome the paucity of the data at the ethnic homeland level (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou 2013).
Second, our index measuring the levels of pre-colonial institutions for the present in-
vestigation may be more accurate. As in Chapter 2, the current analysis uses Murdocks
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(1967) index of Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local Community to measure the
institutional complexity of ethnic groups -please refer to Chapter 2 for more details on
this index. Though, unlike the method implemented in the previous Chapter, the index
now does not need data on the population shares of the di¤erent Amerindian groups. As
you may recall from the second Chapter, data on the share of the Amerindian groups
was used in order to calculate for each subnational state the population-weighted aver-
age of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index for all the Amerindian groups. Yet such
population-weighted index did not cover all the Amerindian groups in each subnational
state. On the other hand, the index for the current empirical investigation only uses
the discrete value of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index of the most representative
ethnic group that lived in each ethnic homeland. Of course, the index may also su¤er
of measurement errors coming from the possible imprecisions in developing the historio-
graphical maps. Nevertheless, it is worth experimenting both routes by which case one
may nd that the general hypothesis of the present doctoral thesis solidies.
Third, I relax the assumptions of the main hypothesis. In Chapter 2, I assume that
the pre-colonial institutions are mainly attached onto people -principally with Amerindian
origins. Though, Amerindians may have changed considerably over the time as a result
of diseases, destruction, exploitation and forced displacements during the colonial and
post-colonial periods. Moreover, the fact that some subnational states today have a very
low proportion of Amerindian population, one may also want to argue if such assumption
is still robust. The present empirical investigation assumes, instead, that the pre-colonial
institutions are attached onto geographical regions. The main idea is that as new people
move into a given geographic region they are inuenced by the institutional framework
already in place there. This methodological strategy then allows me to only assume that
regions where more advanced ethnic groups lived prior colonisation -as measured by their
institutional complexity- tend to reect as a whole better levels of economic development
today -irrespective of the number of Amerindians groups that have resided or live there.
In order to attest accurately the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions in Latin
America, a substantial array of geographical and locational fundamentals are also added to
the new dataset. For this, as with the main development outcome -satellite light density-,
data drawn through geospatial methods is also generated at the ethnic homeland level.
Data at this novel level of analysis allows me to account seriously the important role of
key geographical and locational forces driving also the variation of our main economic
development outcome.
Additionally, I supplement the new dataset with the state-level data that was prepared
for the previous Chapter in an e¤ort to include more historical information other than
the levels of institutional complexity of ethnic groups. This allows me to control for
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important historical factors (e.g. pre-colonial population density) that may be also behind
the distribution of my main development outcome.
By developing a comprehensive methodological strategy, the present Chapter provides
a deeper understanding of the formation of contemporary development over the long-run
of todays nations in Latin America. The main results essentially support my previous
ndings. I show that ethnic homelands in Latin America that were historically inhabited
by more advanced ethnic groups -as measured by their levels of institutional complexity-
relate to a higher light density today -as a proxy for economic activity. These results
hold even after controlling for various observable and hard-to-account-for country-specic
features computed at the ethnic homeland level as well.
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the main links in
the literature with the present research addressing the e¤ects of ethnic homelands in Latin
America on contemporary development. In section 3.3, I provide a very brief historical
explanation given evidence as to why ethnic homelands may have a¤ected development
in Latin America over the long-run. Section 3.4 outlines the data and novel methodology
implemented to uncover this association. Section 3.5 presents the main empirical results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
Within economics, the study of Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) is the only formal
contribution investigating empirically the relationship between ethnic institutional ad-
vancements and contemporary development through the e¤ects of historical ethnic home-
lands. Yet the authors focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, where colonisation took a rather
di¤erent form than in Latin America. Relying on the large variation of institutional
complexities that ethnic groups had prior colonisation, they found a positive relationship
between pre-colonial institutions and economic development outcomes -as measured by
light density at night. My research advances Michalopoulos and Papaioannous ndings
by analysing this link too but within the Latin American context, and on the basis of the
historical ethnic homelands as well. The main ndings of the present study are consistent
to Michalopoulos and Papaioannous hypothesis: ethnic homelands historically inhabited
by ethnic groups with more complex institutional features are related to better levels of
economic development in Latin America today.
This empirical investigation also provides evidence on the growing body of compara-
tive development studies investigating the origins of wealth of the developing countries.
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In the Latin American context, these studies o¤er several approaches but most of their
conjectures rest on the role of colonial institutions shaping the paths of development in the
long-run. (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Sokolo¤
and Engerman 2011). My research expands these ndings by looking at the variation of
the institutional complexities of ethnic groups in the advent of the Europeansarrival in
the Americas in the XVI century.
The line of research of the present paper is also linked to an inuential literature
addressing the persistence of institutional factors (North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Angeles 2011; Dell 2010; Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2016);
state capacity of nations (Diamond 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2013); and state formation
(Bockstette et al. 2002) My results o¤er novel evidence on the important role of institu-
tional advancements of ethnic groups in shaping the paths of economic development over
the long-run in Latin America.
3.3 Historical context
The following section o¤ers a brief historical context placing emphasis on the persistency
of institutional advancements of ethnic groups a¤ecting economic development over the
long-run in Latin America.
Certainly, various reasons would make almost implausible in using traditional ethnic
homelands in Latin America to explore the long-run e¤ects of ethnic features on present-
day development outcomes. No single ethnic group in Latin America escaped from the
various havocs introduced through colonisation. Diseases, destruction and exploitation
transformed the life and space of the large variety of ethnic groups that lived prior coloni-
sation. The map of the Americas was then drawn based on the large delimitations marked
by Europeans overlooking the existence of numerous ethnic homelands. However, as has
been noted before, colonisation expanded under di¤erent paths depending on major geo-
graphical determinants, as well as on key ethnic-specic characteristics that the Europeans
encountered at their arrival in the Americas in 1492.
In the advent of colonisation, detailed historiographical evidence suggests that several
ethnic groups lived within their own ethnic homeland all along Latin America. These
ethnic groups had a rather di¤erent way of organisation. As such, a few of them had
established large centralised political systems in Central Mexico and some parts in South
America. For instance, in South America, the Incas implemented the largest and more
sophisticated political and administrative systems in the Americas (e.g. corvée labour or
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mita). In Central Mexico, the Aztecs established institutions rivalling those in the Inca
Empire. Some other groups located, for instance, in what is today Colombia and Ecuador
had also similar paramount chiefdom characteristics (e.g. Chibchas, Quito or Catios) for
which systems large enough to control various kingdoms beyond the fringe of their local
communities were one of their singular ethnic features.
On the other hand, many smaller groups such as the ones that lived in the Amazonas
and the Pampas regions had less centralised and more political autonomous ethnic features.
These groups were organised into small bands, and their ways of living did not require to
run systems capable of administering complex political activities other than the necessary
tasks that allowed them to subsist independently.
At the time of contact, Europeans somehow understood these di¤erences of ethnic
power structures, as well as the strategic advantages that came with them. Besides the
expected struggles, colonisers found it easier to subjugate and settle in areas where larger
groups inhabited. The already established complex ethnic systems of more advanced
groups allowed them to control the native population and extract resources rapidly through
the help of local leaders. Caciques or kurakas provided, for at least a century or so, essential
administrative and authority tasks over many small communities by generating the main
tributes and supply of labour for the expansion of the colonial enterprise. A prominent
envoy of the Spanish crown wrote (Saignes 1999, p. 65):
"The day we decide to count and tax all Indians individually, so that if they have paid
they are no longer under the domination and authority of the caciques and under their
orders, being free to go wherever they want, we will have taken away the restraint that
holds them together in an orderly manner, for this is the way in which they survive and
have survived before the Christians obtained these realms: if one could put this fact to the
test for only one year, one would clearly see their destruction".
Recent studies have found a large variation of the economic activity undertaken in the
colonial period within present-day Latin Americas nations. As colonisation progressed,
the relative stability that these areas o¤ered well into the second century of colonisation
may have enabled Europeans to develop some solid economic activities, as well as the main
political and nancial centres1. Indeed, although the conguration of most - if not all- the
ethnic homelands vanished as the colonial power entered in the continent, it seems that
one important determinant for colonisers to settle and operate economically and politically
was the degree of state capacity of ethnic groups.
1It is important to note that while the literature points out that the areas with higher development
gave way to the establishment of extractiveeconomic activities -resulting in negative consequences for
economic development over the long-run, recent evidence addressing the reversal of fortunehypothesis
at the subnational level is somewhat less clear. Please see Bruhn and Gallego (2012) and Maloney and
Valencia (2015) for two important contrasting views on such hypothesis.
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3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Digitalisation of Murdocks historiographical maps
The present Chapter constructs a new dataset drawn from two main sources containing
a series of Peter G. Murdocks historiographical publications of maps and ethnographic
data portraying spatially the locations of ethnic homelands in Latin America as of the
XVI century.
The rst source comes from the Outline of South American Cultures (Murdock 1951).
In this book, Murdock classied ethnic groups from Central and South America according
to their main traditional ethnic homelands. Separated into 24 di¤erent maps to correspond
the modern political divisions in this region, Murdock identied the spatial location of 216
ethnic homelands as of prior contact with Europeans. Each of these ethnic homelands are
represented by the main ethnic group that historically inhabited them. For example, the
map of what is today Colombia has a conglomeration of 24 ethnic homelands representing
by a larger ethnic group such as Chibcha, Witoto, Catio, etc.
In addition to the ethnographic information on the spatial location of the ethnic home-
lands, Murdock also provided in this book ethnographic data summarising key ethnic char-
acteristics. Amongst the data included was the institutional complexity of ethnic groups.
As I will explain below, this information helps me expand the number of observations in
my dataset by allowing me to assign the respective value of institutional complexity of
some ethnic groups.
The Ethnographic Bibliography of North America (Murdock and OLearly 1975) is
my second source. In this material, Murdock and OLeary provided the classication of
ethnic groups in North America, including from the groups that historically inhabited the
Mexican territory. As in the rst source, authors outline the spatial location of ethnic
homelands into di¤erent maps, as well as into a single hemisphere map. From this book,
I use the ethnic homelands that fall exclusively within the territorial domains of Mexico,
and append them to the rest of the maps so that the mainland of Latin American countries
is fully covered in the empirical analysis.
Unlike the previous source, though, this second book does not provide a summary on
the major ethnic characteristics. Nor did have a complete outline of the ethnic homelands
in Mexico and some parts in Central America, in particular within the area along the
Yucatan Peninsula and Guatemala -a culture area where Maya-related groups lived. Yet
through this source another 45 ethnic homelands that historically inhabited by di¤erent
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ethnic groups (e.g. such as Aztecs, Mixtecos, Tepehuanos, Seri, Huave, etc.) are added to
the units collected from the previous Murdocks historiography material.
In order to empirically analyse the e¤ects of the historical ethnic homelands in Latin
America, I digitise these series of historiographical maps through the use of Geographical
Information Systems (GIS). To do so, I project these maps on a geographical software by
using the two-dimensional coordinates of grids as specied in my sources. This allows me
to establish the geographical location of my maps on a at surface so that the drawing of
the ethnic homelands can be then performed consistently all along the digitalisation.
Figure 3.1 shows the full digitalisation of the ethnic homelands in Latin America.
The black line represents the ethnic homelands boundaries prior contact with Europeans,
whereas the red line depicts the contemporary administrative divisions of Latin American
countries. A total of 375 ethnic homelands are created. Such increase in units is as a
result of the intersection of the ethnic homelands with the current boundaries of countries
making them fall across more than two neighbouring countries. For instance, the ethnic
homeland of the Aymara group in South America is partitioned across three countries:
Bolivia, Chile and Peru.
It is worth pointing out that the area along the coast between Venezuela and Brazil in
South America is in blank. This area corresponds to the countries of Guyana, Suriname
and French Guiana. I omit this land in order to be consistent with the analysis conducted
in the previous chapter. In so doing, I only loose one ethnic group (Arawak). As such,
another six ethnic groups that lived within the land of the Caribbean countries are also
omitted. Finally, and as mentioned earlier, one can see too that the Yucatan Peninsula
and Guatemala, as well as some land in the south of Honduras and El Salvador, were not
included in the analysis due to the lack of ethnographic data2. As a robustness check,
though, I add in the empirical analysis only the omitted area that fall within Mexico and
Guatemala by assigning the corresponding values of the most representative ethnic group
that historically inhabited this region -the Maya group.
3.4.2 Constructing main predictor, outcomes and controls
To measure the institutional complexity of the ethnic groups that historically inhabited
these ethnic homelands, I build on the pioneering anthropological data drawn from the
2None of the two sources that I used to digitise the ethnic homelands did not develop historiographical
work of this particular area. Though, according to alternative sources such as GREG dataset ( available
at http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/other/greg), I found that most of the missing area seems to be a region
where mainly Maya-related groups live today.
45
Figure 3.1: Traditional Ethnic Homelands in Latin America
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Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas (1967). From this source, I use the variable called Jurisdic-
tional Hierarchy beyond the Local Community, which classies the institutional complexity
of ethnic groups as outlined before.
For this, I have to match the ethnic groups included in my new dataset to the ones
classied in the Atlas. As a result, only around of one quarter of my observations receive a
value of institutional complexity (135 observations out of 375). To overcome missing values
in my data, I implement the following methodological strategy. I use the ethnographic
data on institutional complexity of ethnic groups provided through the book: Outline of
South American Cultures (OSAC). The rule to follow is to input a value on an ethnic
group from the OSAC source only if the Atlas does not provide it. So, in cases where the
value on institutional complexity are recorded on both sources (Atlas/OSAC), I use the
information as documented in the Atlas. Such strategy is supported by the fact that the
correlation obtaining between these cases is very high (89%). This, thereby, enables me to
expand up to two quarters the number of ethnic groups with a valid value on institutional
complexity standing at 265. The analysis will use this sample of 265 observations for the
main empirical investigation. Though, in the robustness section, and as conducted in the
second Chapter of the present thesis, I assign a value of zero of Murdocks index -denoting
stateless characteristics- to the ethnic groups that are still having missing values.
Nevertheless, the construction of our index measuring the institutional complexity of
ethnic groups seems to have a measurement problem not found in my previous chapter.
As noted before, the values of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local Com-
munity takes a categorical form ranging between 0 to 4. In our dataset none of our 265
observations report a value 3; only 2 take a value of 4; 28 a value of 2; 34 a value of 1; and
202 the lowest level, 0. To minimise measurement errors as result of outliers, I include
all the groups reporting paramount chiefdom and state-related characteristics into level 2.
Our index thus takes three categorical values: level 0 signifying stateless groups; level 1
representing groups with petty chiefdom features; and level 2 for groups with paramount
chiefdom and state-related characteristics. To be consistent to the denition of measures
in the present thesis, I call this variable as pre-colonial institutions (PCI), which takes
ordinal values ranging from 0 to 2, where zero denotes groups with stateless features and
2 depicts groups with paramount chiefdom and state-related characteristics.
Figure 3.2 shows the variation of the measure of pre-colonial institutions of ethnic
groups in Latin America as of the XVI century. The red colour denotes the ethnic home-
lands in which more advanced groups inhabited (paramount chiefdoms & state-related
groups); the green colour represents the areas where petty chiefdoms lived; and the grey
colour signies the areas where less centralised and more political autonomous groups
lived. The white areas represent the ethnic groups with no information of Murdocks
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institutional complexity (as mentioned above, in our robustness check section below, I
include these areas by assigning a value of zero of Murdocks institutional complexity).
As it can be seen, -all together- the variation is prominent, with some areas like the Gran
Chaco and Amazonas in South America having the lowest value of pre-colonial institutions
(level zero). Meanwhile, areas such as Central Mexico, the weastern and some parts in
the north-eastern of South America concentrate ethnic groups with paramount chiefdom
and state-related features (level two).
To measure the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions of ethnic groups on present-day
economic development outcomes in Latin America, I build on recent work in using satel-
lite light density data as a proxy for economic development (Henderson et al. 2012;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). The data is collected by the Defence Meteoro-
logical Satellite Programs Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) through satellite
images of light density at night across the globe. This work is done in a systematic way
throughout the year so that a series of images are gathered, scientically cleaned from
any disturbance (such as cloudy days, sunny spells, etc.), and averaged on a yearly basis.
The data take discrete values ranging from 0 to 63, and is presented in raster les with a
ner resolution of 30-second grid (similar as one squared kilometre). I intersect my ethnic
homelands with the raster les on light density. Thereby, all the grids that fall within the
ethnic homelands are averaged; as a result an overall level of economic activity at this novel
level of analysis is captured. I use the data on light density from the period 2000-2013.
This measure is my main development outcome throughout the empirical investigation.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the variation of economic activity at the level of ethnic homelands
in Latin America -as measured by light density at night. As the thickness of the colour
increases it would be an indication of areas with higher levels of economic development.
At rst sight, it seems that areas inhabited by more advanced groups such as the weastern
of South America and Central America tend to reect, on average, more light density at
night, yet there are areas that were historically inhabited by less advanced groups with
high levels of light density as well like in the southside of Latin America.
To attest the history of institutionally-advanced ethnic features in Latin America con-
ditional on major fundamentals of nationsdevelopment, I proceed as follows. I construct a
large array of controls in a similar manner as my light density data. First, I am particularly
interested in controlling for the following geographic factors:
 Land quality: This is a geospatial index that examines the land suitability for agri-
culture through three major geographic components: croplands, climate conditions
and soil characteristics (Ramankutty et al. 2002). It takes values between 0 and 1,
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Figure 3.2: Pre-Colonial Institutions within Ethnic Homelands in
Latin America
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with higher values denoting more fertile land. I compute this index by averaging all
the grids that fall within each ethnic homeland.
 Elevation: By computing the average of all the grids in each ethnic homeland, I
obtain the average elevation at the required level of analysis.
 Temperature: This is the mean yearly temperature data over the period 1950-2000.
I average all the grids falling within my unit of analysis.
 Precipitation: This is the mean yearly precipitation data (mm) over the period
1950-2000. I compute the data as my temperature variable above.
 Malaria: This is an index capturing the stability of malaria transmission across the
world (Kiszewski et al. 2004). I calculate the average of the grids for each ethnic
homeland.
 Latitude: I compute the absolute latitude in each ethnic homeland.
Second, it is still possible that the association between my measure of pre-colonial
institutions and contemporary economic development is a¤ected due to other omitted
factors related to the demographical or technological success of nations driving the paths
of development in the long-run. As such, I also control for the following determinants of
development:
 Oil & Gas: Using geospatial data drawn from the project called Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), I create an indicator equals one if there is an oil or gas eld
within an ethnic homeland, and zero otherwise.
 Population Density in Logs: Using the population digital data (as of 2000) from the
United Nations Environment Program, I calculate the population density for each
unit (in logs) by taking the average of all the grids as before.
 Nearest Distance to Capital: For each country, I calculate the nearest distance of
ethnic homelands to the capitals. For example, using the centroid of each ethnic
homeland within the Mexican territory, I compute their nearest distance (in kilome-
tres) to Mexico City.
The next step is to implement a method that aims to account for alternative mech-
anisms mediating the distribution of economic development in the long-run. As noted
before, colonial factors served as a potential exogenous variation of nationseconomic suc-
cess throughout time. Colonisers transformed the systems that they encountered at their
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Figure 3.3: Light Density at Night within Ethnic Homelands in
Latin America
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arrival in the New World, a¤ecting since then the direction of development of todays
Latin American countries. Yet such transformation took place based on -but not only-
the di¤erent ethnic institutional advancements established prior colonisation. As colonis-
ers settled in areas characterised from having more advanced ethnic groups, their main
economic activities were more likely to be established, and for consequence, the political
and nancial institutions that held them. As already documented in the literature, this
friction may have a¤ected, by and large, the development of regions in Latin America
giving rise to a higher economic outcome over time in places that guaranteed during the
colonial period more solid European activities as a whole.
Thus, I construct a crude measure of economic activities implemented during the colo-
nial period within my ethnic homelands. For that, I rely on my state-level data that was
prepared for the previous chapter. From this data, I use the following historical indicators
measuring the within-countries variation of colonial activities (Bruhn and Gallego 2012):
 Other colonial activities: An indicator that takes a value of one if a subnational
state in the Americas developed economic activities related to agriculture during
the colonial period, and zero otherwise.
 No colonial activities: An indicator that takes a value of one if a subnational state
in the Americas did not develope economic activities during the colonial period, and
zero otherwise.
 Plantations: This is also an indicator taking a value of one if plantations were
recorded during the colonial period in a subnational state across the Americas, and
zero otherwise.
 Mining: This indicator measures the presence of mining activities in the colonial
period at the subnational state level by taking a value of one if such economic
colonial activity was presence and zero otherwise.
To capture the variation of colonial activities at the ethnic homeland level, I intersect
our map of ethnic homelands with a map containing all the contemporary boundaries of
subnational states in Latin America. As a result, the ethnic homelands fall within the
boundaries of one or more subnational states. For each historical indicator, I then simply
compute the average of the respective values of the subnational states falling in each
ethnic homeland. For instance, Figure 3.4 shows the intersection of the ethnic homeland
of the Catio group -an ethnic group reporting centralised institutional features. As it
can be seen, the area of the ethnic homeland of this group is mainly falling across four
subnational states in Colombia: Cordoba, Antioquia, Choco and Risalda. By using the
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information of the indicator on other colonial activities from my state-level data, we know
that the rst two subnational states recorded other economic activities during the colonial
period (taking a value of 1), whereas the Choco and Risalda states did not (taking a
value of zero). So, the value of other colonial actitivities for the ethnic homeland of the
Catio group is the average of these four dummies. I use the same strategy to compute the
remaining indicators on plantations, mining and no colonial activities. Thus, four separate
variables are created measuring the type of colonial activities that may have been taken
place within the fringes of the ethnic homelands3.
In addition to the above measures on colonial activities, I am also in the position
to exploit other relevant historical information along with present-day statistics from my
state-level data. As regards the historical information, I am particularly interested in mea-
suring pre-colonial population density. This information would be useful to control for pre-
colonial development other than the institutional advancements of ethnic groups. More-
over, I am also interested in using statistics measuring the todays share of Amerindian
population. This information will be useful to control for the discriminatory e¤ects trans-
mitted via the Amerindian population, picking up as a result a biased downward e¤ect on
the coe¢ cient for pre-colonial institutions.
It is important to note that, as in the indicators on colonial activities, these two
additional variables are computed by calculating the average of the respective values of
the subnational states falling in the ethnic homelands. For example, using the same
ethnic group as above, the value on pre-colonial population density for the Catio group
in Colombia will be equal to average of the values on pre-colonial population density
corresponding to the subnational states of Cordoba, Antioquia, Choco and Risalda.
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
As Panel A of Table 3.1 shows, the number of ethnic homelands within the contemporary
countries in Latin America vary, as well as the territorial size of them. The amount of
ethnic homelands in nine countries ranges between 12 to 46 -with the exception of Brazil
with the largest number in the dataset at 102. The other six countries have relatively
less ethnic homelands from only 1 (El Salvador and Uruguay) to 6 (Honduras). The
3As an alternative strategy, I created indicators assigning a value of one if an ethnic homeland is
intersected by a subnational state reporting these colonial activities. For instance, if an ethnic homeland
falls within three subnational states and only one reports these colonial activities, this unit takes a value
of one. Though, such strategy did not change the main results of the present research.
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Figure 3.4: Intersection between Ethnic Homelands and Subna-
tional States (Colombia)
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territorial domains of these ethnic homelands also oscillate plenty, from the biggest sizes
corresponding to the groups like Tupi, Incas, Aztecs, Araucanias, Charruas, with a land
area ranging as much as 616,000 sq. km., to the smallest ethnic homelands with a land
area as lower as 61 sq. km (Encabellado group).
The summary statistics of our main variables is in Panel B of Table 3.1. The continous
values of the dependent variable on light density range between 0 and 32, yet its distri-
bution is fairly stable as depicted by the value of the standard deviation. In Panel B, I
also report the summary statistics on our main independent variables. As it can be seen,
only 265 observations received a valid value of institutional complexity. Finally, I am also
reporting in the last rows of Panel B all the array of geographical, location and historical
controls. Please refer to Table B.1 of Appendix B for specic details on the main sources
and description of variables.
3.5 Empirical strategy and main results
3.5.1 Econometric model
To examine the long-run e¤ects of Pre-Colonial Institutions on the basis of the traditional
ethnic homelands, I use the following main specication:
Ye;c = PCIe;c + popdene;c + `Amepope;c + Xe;c + c + "e;c (1)
In equation 1 subscript e indicates ethnic group and subscript c signies countries. Ye;c
represents our measure of light density at night as a proxy for economic activity at the
level of ethnic homeland. PCIe;c is our categorical measure of pre-colonial institutions.
popdene;c is controlling for population density in modern days and Amepope;c for todays
share of Amerindian population. Xe;c is our main vector of controls for geographic and
location factors. Country xed e¤ects are also included -c. Our standard errors are
clustered at both country and ethnic homeland levels following the approach developed
by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011); and applied in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013).
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Panel A
Country Nun. Ethnic Min. land area Max. land area
homelands (sq. km.) (sq. km.)
Argentina 27 1260.883 1291940
Bolivia 35 582.2659 293066
Brazil 102 294.8566 616320
Chile 12 7562.352 333230
Colombia 39 517.9127 150851
Costa Rica 3 13678.45 20544.39
Ecuador 17 277.481 41445.74
El Salvador 1 7780.768 7780.768
Honduras 6 766.069 34009.07
Mexico 46 993.1024 306319
Nicaragua 4 716.8536 102069
Panama 3 10941.22 33622.36
Paraguay 15 2010.41 96656.65
Peru 34 61.64779 379921
Ururguay 1 250640 250640
Venezuela 30 667.3262 88899.95
TOTAL 375
Panel B
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Main dependent variable:
Average Light Density at Night 375 10.1049 5.849169 0 32.17237
Main independent variables:
Pre-Colonial Institutions 265 0.3509434 0.6752168 0 2
Controls:
Population density in modern days (logs) 375 2.037937 2.483619 -4.60517 6.604855
Share of Amerindian population 375 0.1233403 0.1408891 0.0010034 0.7845646
Malaria 375 2.509646 1.837855 0 5.666667
Absolute latitude 375 14.22596 11.32516 0.1166143 54.80722
Land Suitability Index 375 0.3655606 0.2851374 0 0.998
Elevation 375 639.8869 763.7535 5.083333 4415.238
Mean Yearly Precipitation in mm 375 144.6934 76.68576 5.354762 517.9863
Mean Yearly Temperature in Celsius 375 21.87064 5.45098 0.7953707 28.01937
Distance to capitals (in km.) 375 392386.7 392984.5 0 1409249
Oil & Gas Dummy 375 0.3013333 0.4594502 0 1
Pre-colonial population density (logs) 374 0.0793835 1.416842 -5.120699 3.420635
Other economic activities 372 0.5867498 0.3433686 0 1
Plantation 372 0.0764325 0.1893317 0 1
Mining 372 0.1625331 0.2722902 0 1
No colonial activities 372 0.1742845 0.2776389 0 1
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3.5.2 Empirical results
Table 3.2 reports the association between the legacy of pre-colonial institutions and con-
temporary economic development at the ethnic homeland level in Latin America. Our
specications use as dependent variable light density at night to proxy for economic ac-
tivity at this level of analysis. The large array of controls will be included gradually so
that we systematically inspect the response of our main independent variable measuring
the legacy of pre-colonial institutions. Since our development outcome takes a continuous
form, OLS estimators are used throughout the specications.
We start by including in specication (1) of Table 3.2 our variable on pre-colonial
institutions; our control for population density in 2000s; plus country-xed e¤ects4. The
inclusion of xed e¤ects allows me not only to exploit within-country variation but also to
control for unobservable country-specic characteristics. As noted in my previous Chapter,
I am particular interested in controlling for some colonial and post-colonial institutional
factors a¤ecting the variation of my main development outcome. Moreover, due to the
fact that some of my units of analysis are partitioned in more than two countries, plus
the possibility that intra-related ethnic characteristics may be correlated within major
ethnolinguistic families, I am clustering my standard errors at both country and ethnic
levels. As it stands, the results support the main thesis of the present research. The
coe¢ cient capturing the legacy of pre-colonial institutions is positive and signicant at
5% level.
In column (2), I augment my specication by including the variable on the share
of Amerindian population in modern days. As expected the sign of the coe¢ cient is
negative but it cannot explain the variation on our outcome at all. More importantly,
by adding this control our coe¢ cient for pre-colonial institutions increases in magnitude
and signicance levels. This may suggest a biased downward e¤ect on the coe¢ cient
for pre-colonial institutions caused by the discriminatory e¤ects transmitted through the
Amerindian population -as shown in my previous chapter.
I nally add in column (3) our large array of geographic, locational and natural re-
sources controls. Recent ndings in Maloney and Valencia (2015) suggest that the evo-
lution of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial settlements have been a¤ected by
locational fundamentals -along with agglomeration e¤ects. For instance, ethnic groups
prior colonisation tended to be located in more suitable areas; Europeans followed suit
during the colonial period; so did the societies in modern days. If that is the case then all
these factors but the legacy of institutional complexity are the main drivers of the variation
4Please note that as in Chapter 2, population density may be regarded as a "bad control". Thus,
interpretation of results using this variable should be cautiously.
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Table 3.2: Baseline results
Dependent variable: Light density at night (2000-2013)
Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.702** 0.777*** 0.634***
[0.326] [0.288] [0.187]
Population density (2000s) 1.618*** 1.562*** 1.433***
[0.0839] [0.0908] [0.233]
Share of Ame. Pop. -2.988 -2.084
[2.244] [2.285]
Absolute latitude 0.0731
[0.0568]
Precipitation -0.630
[0.617]
Temperature 1.679
[1.362]
Elevation 0.477*
[0.256]
Malaria -0.327
[0.337]
Land Suitability Index -0.394
[0.568]
Distance to capitals (km.) 6.07e-07
[2.10e-06]
Oil & Gas Dummy 1.853**
[0.737]
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES
Observations 265 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 0.514 0.553
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country and ethnic
levels are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of our economic development outcome within the geographical areas under study. All in
all, the results reassure our main hypothesis: pre-colonial institutions relate to better lev-
els of economic development in ethnic homelands historically inhabited by more advanced
ethnic groups in Latin America.
While our results already control for unobservable country-specic characteristics and
a large array of geographical and locational fundamentals, other important historical fac-
tors may be the main source of variation of our development outcome. As noted above,
Europeans settled in areas where more advanced ethnic groups lived as a result of key
locational fundamentals and agglomeration e¤ects (Maloney and Valencia 2015). This in
turn gave way to di¤erent types of colonial activities all along Latin America triggering a
potential exogenous variation of nationseconomic success throughout time. If all these
historical factors have an e¤ect on the economic activity undertaken within our units
of analysis, the causal channel that I hypothesize between pre-colonial institutions and
economic development would then be through these historical factors.
To test the above alternative channels, in column (1) of Table 3.3, I add our mea-
sure of pre-colonial population density as a relevant control for pre-colonial development
other than the institutional complexity of ethnic groups. The specication includes our
variable of interest, along with the comprehensive set of geographical and locational con-
trols, plus country xed e¤ects. The results strongly support our thesis. The coe¢ cient
for pre-colonial institutions remain unchanged. Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient for pre-colonial
population density is not statistically signicant di¤erent from zero. Though, we obtain a
negative association. This may go in line with our previous analysis and the main results
in the existing literature pointing out towards what is known as the "reversal of fortune"
(Acemoglu et al. 2002; Bruhn and Gallego 2012).
In column (2), I augment the specication by adding the set of indicators for the
di¤erent colonial activities leaving the indicator for no colonial activities as our reference
category. Once again, our coe¢ cient for pre-colonial institutions remain positive and very
signicant suggesting that the type of colonial activity is not mediating the variation of
economic development within our units of analysis. On the other hand, in terms of the
e¤ects of colonial activities, all the indicators show a negative association with our main
development outcome but with insignicant e¤ects5.
Finally, I am also in the position to implement an empirical strategy to examine the
accuracy of our measure on pre-colonial institutions. First, our categorical variable on
pre-colonial institutions is transformed into an indicator taking the value of one to ethnic
5Please note that as in Chapter 2, colonial activities may be regarded as a "bad control". Thus,
interpretation of results using these variables should be cautiously.
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Table 3.3: Pre-Colonial Development and Colonial Activities
Dependent variable: Light density at night (2000-2013)
Variables: (1) (2)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.666*** 0.651***
[0.198] [0.190]
Pre-colonial population density -0.303 -0.262
[0.326] [0.400]
Other Colonial Activities -1.223
[0.966]
Plantation activities -1.582
[1.124]
Mining activities -0.0358
[1.458]
Controls for:
Population Density (2000s) YES YES
Share of Ame. Pop. YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Observations 264 262
Adjusted R-squared 0.555 0.557
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country and ethnic
levels are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
groups reporting paramount chiefdom and state-related characteristics (values 1 and 2 of
Murdocks index), and zero to groups reecting stateless features (level zero). The aim of
this aggregation is to reduce measurement errors in Murdocks categorical index.
In Table 3.4, column (1) reports results using the dummy form of our variable on
pre-colonial institutions. Of course, I am also including all the array of controls as in the
previous specications from Table 3.3. For abbreviating reasons, I am not reporting the
coe¢ cients of this set of controls. The results once again support the main thesis of the
present chapter. The coe¤cient on pre-colonial institutions increases in magnitude and
remains statistically signicant, though at 5% level.
Second, I create three separate indicators measuring the di¤erent levels of institutional
complexities of ethnic groups: i) stateless groups, ii) petty chiefdoms, and iii) paramount
chiefdoms and state-related groups. Before reporting the econometric results, I have graph-
ically visualised in Figure 3.5 these indicators against our main development outcome. The
y-axis shows the mean of light density, whereas along the x-axis these indicators are piled
up side-by-side. From this data visualisation, it is clear the larger di¤erences of economic
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Figure 3.5: Categories of Pre-Colonial Institutions and Light Den-
sity at Night
Table 3.4: Pre-Colonial Institutions (dummy approach)
Dependent variable: Light density at night (2000-2013)
Variables: (1) (2)
Pre-Colonial Institutions (dummy) 0.958**
[0.417]
Petty Chiefdoms 0.657
[0.621]
Larger groups 1.299***
[0.256]
Controls for:
Population Density (2000s) YES YES
Pre-colonial population density YES YES
Colonial activities YES YES
Share of Ame. Pop. YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Observations 264 262
Adjusted R-squared 0.559 0.557
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country and ethnic
levels are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
61
activity within the ethnic homelands depending on the legacy of institutional complexity
of ethnic groups. Areas that were historically inhabited by more advanced groups tend to
reect on average 30% more light density at night as compared to the areas where groups
with stateless characteristics lived, and around of 11% higher with respect to the petty
chiefdom groups.
In columns (2) of Table 3.4, I report the specications to explore these individual
e¤ects of institutional complexity of ethnic groups, conditional on observable and unob-
servable country-specic characteristics. The specication uses the two indicators for petty
chiefdoms and larger groups all together, leaving the indicator for stateless groups as our
reference category. The results remain in favour of our thesis. The coe¢ cient on larger
ethnic groups is highly signicant and very large in magnitude.
3.5.3 Robustness checks
The robustness of the results is tested through various alternative approaches. First, as
one could see from Figure 3.1, the Yucatan Peninsula and Guatemala were not included
in the analysis due to the lack of ethnographic data. This is a relevant area not only
because of the large size of land (225,000 sq. km. approx.) but also due to the fact
that it is a culture area where Maya-related groups lived (Quiches, Chori, Cakchique,
etc.). I include this land as part of the Maya group taking thus a value of 1 of Murdocks
institutional complexity. In Table 3.5, specication in column (1) uses our benchmark
dataset with 265 ethnic homelands plus the homeland of the Maya group. Light density
is our main outcome; our main independent variable is our categorical variable of pre-
colonial institutions; and all the controls are also included as of specications of Table 3.4.
The main independent variable is positive and signicant conrming again the thesis of
the present research.
Second, one may also want to think of the Maya group as one of the most advanced pre-
colonial civilisations in Central Mexico. I then assign a value of 2 of Murdocks institutional
complexity to the area where Maya-related groups lived -in line with the values of the larger
groups in this region (e.g. Aztecs, Tarascos, Zapotecs). Column 2 of Table 3.5 shows the
results using this approach. As it can be seen, our main coe¢ cient dropped by a third of
its size, yet the correct sign is still positive and statistically indistinguishable from zero at
1% level.
Third, I expand the size of observations in the dataset in an e¤ort to cover all the ethnic
homelands digitised in Latin America. As one can see from Figure 3.2, there are some
ethnic groups that were left without information of Murdocks institutional complexity
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Table 3.5: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Light density at night (2000-2013)
Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.653*** 0.456*** 0.501**
[0.189] [0.177] [0.235]
Controls for:
Population Density (2000s) YES YES YES
Pre-colonial population density YES YES YES
Colonial activities YES YES YES
Share of Ame. Pop. YES YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES
Observations 263 263 372
Adjusted R-squared 0.557 0.556 0.551
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country and ethnic
levels are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
due to the lack of ethnographical data. These groups come from mainly the area of
northern Mexico and some parts in South America. I assign the lowest value of 0 of
Murdocks institutional complexity to these groups, assuming that smaller groups would
be more likely to have been overlooked by anthropologists. This conjecture is conrmed
by the fact that ethnographical data are available for all the larger groups, plus the fact
that most of the ethnic groups with no institutional complexity information come from the
northern of Mexico -an area characterised to have had societies with more hunter-gathering
and chiefdom features. This, thereby, allows me to include all the ethnic homelands
digitised (375 in total). In Table 3.5, the specication in column (3) uses this full dataset
covering all the ethnic homelands. Light density is our dependent variable, and as our
main independent variable I am using our categorical variable of pre-colonial institutions,
along with all the controls as of specications of Table 3.4. The results fully reassure our
previous ndings.
3.6 Conclusions
The present Chapter studied the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on contempo-
rary development in Latin America by relying on a novel dataset pinpointing the geospatial
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location of the traditional ethnic homelands. By using ethnic homelands as the main unit
of analysis, I was able to i) consider a di¤erent measure of economic development (satellite
light density data); ii) relax the main assumptions of the central hypothesis of the present
thesis; iii) compute our index of pre-colonial institutions on the basis of the single or
more representative ethnic group that inhabited these units; and iv) mitigate -once again-
identication problems arising from cultural changes, historical shocks, or colonial and
post-colonial institutions with the use of country-specic xed e¤ects. The main results
showed that the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions relate to a higher light density as a
proxy for economic activity- in ethnic homelands where more advanced ethnic groups lived.
These results held even after controlling for major observable and unobservable country-
specic characteristics, as well as with various methodological alternatives, samplings, and
econometric permutations.
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Chapter 4
On the Mechanisms of Long-Run
E¤ects of Pre-Colonial Institutions in
Latin America
Abstract
This Chapter studies a mechanism linking the persistence of pre-colonial institutions
in Latin America over the long-run: Colonial and post-colonial strategies along with the
ethnic political capacity worked in tandem allowing larger Amerindian groups to "sup-
port" the new political systems in ways that would benet their respective ethnic groups
-and the rest of the population. This mechanism, in turn, may have allowed the e¤ects
of pre-colonial institutions to inuence socioeconomic development outcomes up to to-
day. To shed lights on this mechanism, I combine the index of pre-colonial institutions
prepared for the second chapter of the present thesis with individual-level survey data
on peoples attitudes. By controlling for key observable and unobservable country-specic
characteristics, the main empirical results show that areas with a history of more advanced
pre-colonial institutions increase the probability of individuals supporting present-day po-
litical institutions.
4.1 Introduction
The literature studying the relationship between institutional factors and economic devel-
opment in the long-run has progressed signicantly over the last years. Within this area of
study, economists have placed special attention to the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions
on present-day economic development outcomes
The fundamental contribution of this literature is that it distinguishes the existence
of a pre-colonial ethnic structure below the national system that, to a certain extent, has
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been inuencing socioeconomic development outcomes in the long-run. As one of the most
relevant ethnic characteristics, the institutional complexity that ethnic groups had at the
time of the European arrival stands as one of the most powerful predictors of todays
socioeconomic development outcomes.
Most of the contributions within this literature have concentrated on studying the
actual relationship between pre-colonial institutions and economic development, but very
little has been done to explain empirically the mechanisms through which this link has
taken place. This research aims to contribute on this by looking at a mechanism already
progressed in the literature related to the colonial and post-colonial strategies based on an
indirect rule and the political capacity of more advanced ethnic groups to better process
the new political system (Acemoglu et al. 2013; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).
In the context of Latin America, it seems that the colonial and post-colonial strate-
gies based on an indirect rule, along with the ethnic political capacity worked in tan-
dem allowing larger Amerindian groups to "support" the new political systems in ways
that would benit their respective ethnic groups. As it will be outlined in the historical
context, these strategies were implemented due to -but not only- i) the unfeasibility of
the colonial power to control the large territories in Latin America, ii) the creation of
autonomous Amerindian communities during the colonial period; and iii) the political au-
tonomy granted to some Amerindian communities by the post-colonial political systems.
All this allowed the Amerindian groups in Latin America to preserve some of their tradi-
tional forms of political organisations and, more important, to process on the basis of their
political capacity the new systems introduced throughout the colonial and post-colonial
periods in ways that would benet their respective ethnic group and, therefore, their local
communities, plus the rest of the population at large.
The positive interaction between the political capacity of ethnic groups and the new
political systems may be understood as an alternative explanation for sheding lights on
the mechanism by which the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial factors have a¤ected socioeco-
nomic development outcomes until today. I hypothesise that areas with a history of more
advanced pre-colonial institutions are associated to a higher support of individuals for the
contemporary political institutions.
To test the above hypothesis, this research combines the state-level data prepared for
the second chapter of the present thesis and survey data on peoples attitudes drawn
from the Latinobarometer. From my state-level data, I use the index measuring the
levels of pre-colonial institutions in each subnational state of Latin America. On the
other hand, with the information available in the survey data, I construct four alternative
outcomes measuring the support of individuals for contemporary political institutions
(states, electoral bodies, national congress, and public administration).
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First, I estimate an overall long-run e¤ect by using all the individuals in the survey
regardless their ethnic origins. The main empirical results show that areas with a history
of more advanced pre-colonial institutions increases the probability for individuals sup-
portomg national institutions. Second, since the legacy of pre-colonial institutions would
not be the same across all the di¤erent ethnic groups, I explore these long-run e¤ects on
individualsattitudes by interacting our index of pre-colonial institutions with the infor-
mation of the survey on the di¤erent ethnic identities of individuals. The results show
that the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions vary depending on the di¤erent ethnic identities
of individuals. This may o¤er evidence of some positive externalities coming from the
Amerindian communities on other groups of the population.
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the main links of
the present research with the literature addressing the economic di¤erences in the long-
run. In section 4.3 we provide a historical context placing special e¤orts to make the case
for the mechanism under study. Section 4.4 outlines the data and methodology. Section
4.5 presents the main empirical results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
This research is linked to the growing body of comparative development studies addressing
the long-run e¤ects of ethnic-specic characteristics in the developing world (Gennaioli and
Rainer 2007; Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
2013; Fenske 2014; Alsan 2015).
As a starting point, the present research advances over the studies analysing the ef-
fects of pre-colonial institutions on contemporary development. These studies place great
emphasis on the neglected existence of the dual structure -national versus ethnic- of de-
veloping countries downplaying the role of the central governments as the main political
entities in shaping the economic and political factors. Relying on the large variation of
institutional complexities that ethnic groups had prior colonisation, these studies found a
positive relationship between pre-colonial institutions and di¤erent measures of socieco-
nomic development outcomes. Yet despite that the main conjectures of these studies were
consolidated on the basis of key historical mechanisms, these latter remain to be empiri-
cally explored. By exploiting the variation of individualsattitudes towards the political
system through the added information on the levels of pre-colonial institutions, the present
study explores, specically, the mechanism related to the ethnic political capacity.
Second, this empirical investigation is also linked to the very few and recent studies
analysing the actual mechanisms of ethnic-specic characteristics (Michalopoulos and Pa-
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paioannou 2013). Perhaps the closer study -although more contextualised than empirical-
to the present examination is the one by Acemoglu et al. (2013). They introduced the
indirect rule set up by the colonial power in Africa as a potential mechanism to explain
the positive relationship bewteen pre-colonial institutions and sociecoeconomic develop-
ment outcomes. They argue that after independence such indirect rule was more likely
to be removed in areas with more advanced pre-colonial institutions allowing as a result
the post-colonial government to monopolise the political power and thus bring social and
economic stability for the whole nascent country. On the other hand, in the areas where
stateless groups predominated, the colonial indirect rule endured rather than vanishing
throughout the post-colonial period making di¢ cult for the new political government to
spread its political monopoly.
Third, the study also provides evidence on the state capacity developed by more ad-
vanced ethnic groups in pre-modern times. Diamond (1997) canonical hypothesis, for
example, emphasises the capacity of larger groups to operate a more complex and multi-
layer bureaucratic organisation, capable enough to collect resources and redistribute them
in a form of a public good, for instance. The main ndings of the present study show that,
indeed, more advanced groups in Latin America -as captured by the addition of the levels
of pre-colonial institutions- relate to an increase of population supporting the political
institutions, suggesting an interlink between the past and present of the political capacity
of ethnic groups.
An inuencial literature on the persistence of institutional factors is also linked to
the line of research of the present chapter. With the theorical basis laid down by North
(1990), this literature has put renown interest in providing empirical evidence on the
deep historical roots of contemporary political and economic development of developing
countries (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Bockstette et al. 2002; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Angeles
2011; Dell 2010). My study shows that the pre-colonial institutional advacements of ethnic
groups matter in the subsequent development of a stronger political system in the long-run.
Finally, the research contributes to the recent studies undertaken in other elds outside
economics such as political science. These studies have focused on the emergent and
relevant role of the Amerindian population into the contemporary political apparatus
(Deborah 1998; Deborah 2005; Van Cott 2010). Although the main focus of these studies
is on the electoral political participation of ethnic groups in Latin America, the analytical
signicance of this literature is the recognition of the capacity of ethnic groups in shaping
the political landscape in Latin America. Yet these studies have not able to explain
why is that some ethnic cleavages tend to be more political salient than others. The
present analysis provides an empirical explanation on this by introducing the legacy of
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state capacity of ethnic groups as an important factor for some ethnic cleavages in shaping
the political context of Latin American countries.
4.3 Historical context
Historically, the Amerindian groups have been at the front of major political changes in
Latin America, yet their degree of inuence in the new political context has depended
on their political capacity along with the type of relationship with the colonial and post-
colonial powers based -principally- on an indirect rule.
As has been noted before, although colonisation caused a radical transformation of
the structure of the Amerindian groups in Latin America, it was the colonial strategies
per se that may have allowed these groups to preserve some of their traditional forms
of organisation -including the institutional ones. With the unfeasibility of the colonial
power to control a vast territory, colonisers rely on the bureaucratic structures of the
Amerindian groups -specially from the larger ones- to extract and control the natural
and human resources. While the colonial elite were settled in more accessible places, the
Amerindian groups were gradually pushed to live in remote areas. Though, the inuence of
the colonial power in these areas were limited on the basis of an indirect rule allowing the
Amerindian groups to preserve some of their pre-colonial factors. With the conjecture that
some pre-colonial factors persisted during colonisation it may be the case that -through
these Amerindian rural communities- the inuence of pre-colonial institutions a¤ected the
wealth of Latin American nations.
Now, having a separate life in the remote areas as a result of the indirect rule set
up by the colonial power meant that the Amerindian groups had to provide a certain
level of organisation in their local communities. Thus, the degree of organisation within
these communities may have depended on the ability of the Amerindian groups to learnt
the new political conguration in order to increase the benets for their own groups,
and the rest of the population too. However, some groups were in a better position to
do so than others (Mallon 2010, p. 284). Larger Amerindian groups, such as the Incas
and Aztecs, not only had the political capacity to use the new political system for their
own benet but also they had the institutional advancements to provide the basis and
strategies for the development of the economic and political institutions implemented by
the colonial power (e.g. Encomiendas, Mitas). For example, as the colonial power set
out its settlement strategies in the Southern, Andean groups -through their local leaders-
inuenced Spaniards to undertake an indirect rule upon the idea that it would be more
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economically viable for them (Saignes 1999, p. 66). Certainly with the expected restrictions
imposed by a colonial ruler, local leaders were then given the responsibility to administer
the Spanish tributes and organise the supply of labour for the mining production that was
underway in this region.
When more advanced groups were inuencing the strategies and expansion of the colo-
nial power, stateless groups were constantly seeking a more resistance position towards
the Europeans throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods, and most of the time
in a hostile way. Located in inaccessible geographical locations, these groups -such as
the Chacos groups in Paraguay and Brazil or the Aracaunos in Chile- had weaker insti-
tutional capacity by which the colonial rulers could rely on to control the large number
of hunter-gathering groups scattered in these inhospitable areas. The interaction with
these groups were reduced to temporary, strategic and -in most cases- failed missionary
campaigns leaving little space for these small groups to inuence the political system for
their advantage, and thus failling to o¤er better benits for their own communities.
These contrasting scenarios of the capacity of Amerindian groups surely were key
in shaping the development of their local communities all along the colonial and post-
colonial periods. While the communities linked to more advanced groups enjoyed periods
of relative social stability, areas where stateless groups predominated were essentially
characterised for being in a constant conict. For instance, the area inhabited by the
Aracauno group in Chile is known as a region of "permanent war" not just during the
colonial time but also throughout the post-colonial period (Jones 1999, p. 168) . As a
matter of fact, stateless groups were not only constantly ghting with the Europeans but
also amongst them (Schwartz and Salomon 1999, p. 460), a situation that may have created
social and economic instability and, thus, underdevelopment within their communities.
The above is consistent with the recent ndings on ethnic conicts arguing that
more included ethnic groups are more likely to show stability than the excluded groups
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2015). Disengaged from the political context, stateless groups ex-
cluded themselves to the periphery areas of the colonial and post-colonial rules making
them less peaceful than the larger Amerindian groups, and therefore, less likely to take
advantage from the new political status. As a notable example from late 19th century
is the Pacication War carried out in conjunction by Chile and Argentina in order to
subjugate less peaceful groups located in the Pampas and Aracaunian regions.
On the other hand, all along the colonial period more advanced Amerindian groups
were in a better position to even litigate with the High Courts of New Spain over more land
guarantees for their local communities. The Amerindian groups located in the inner area
of Central Mexico took advantage of the political system established by the colonial rule
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to obtain -through legal disputes- more land tittles in the hope of increasing the economic
gains of their respective communities. A particular case was documented in 1550s, in the
village of Huejotzingo of the Mexican state of Puebla, where native chieftains recovered
"a big expanse of land under cover of the serious dissensions that had troubled this large
village". (Francois 1963, p. 208). In addition to this, these Amerindian groups found ways
to generate further income through the rent of communal property to non-Amerindians
(Young 2000, p. 157). As a result, one may argue that with more economic opportunities
these Amerindian groups may have redistributed these resources within their communities
in the form of better public goods.
Precisely, if one may want to relate the capacity of Amerindian groups to inuence
and, in some ways, "support" the new political system is by looking at their role in de-
fending their communal lands all along the colonial and post-colonial periods. In light of
the possession over some of the lands through the expansion of the land-holding system of
Haciendas in later colonial period, the Amerindian groups located in Central Mexico some-
how managed to overcome this inicting expansion (Schryer 2000, p. 237). For instance, in
order to take hold of as many land as possible, Spanish settlers bought lands to indebted
Amerindians for a small sum, or simply seized lands belonging to deceased Amerindians.
A clear example was documented in mid-XVII century, in the state of Oaxaca, when a
Spanish Crowns settlement inspector found irregularities in the haciendas title deeds.
Fraçois quoted the main conclusion of such Spanish inspector: "It has been ascertained
that all the land sold by notables and inhabitants of these towns, villages, and quarters
did not belong to them, but to Indians dying without heirs" (Francois 1963, p. 217). Yet,
as Fracois noted, larger groups "showed the greatest skill in resisting big sheepmen and
hacendados who wanted to force them into peonage. They obtained royal injunctions, went
to court over their privileges, and cleverly played on the kindly feelings of certain of their
titular protectors"(Francois 1963, p. 219).
The political participation of Amerindian groups went even beyond their local commu-
nities. In the advent of the post-colonial period, educated Amerindian groups in Mexico
were in the positition to campaign with the central government in favour of preserving the
institutions that sustained the economy of their local communities (e.g. parcialidades).
Schryer (2000, p. 251) notes that during the rst decades after independence "small elite
of educated natives...voiced their protest against a government policy that would abolish all
native corporate rights or special institutions designed for native ethnic minorities". These
political gains may have been transferred into the well-being of their local communities.
However, the political participation of Amerindian groups was a¤ected throughout
the post-colonial era by a phenomenon that was perhaps not seen in other parts of the
colonised world: mestizaje. Since late 18th century and onwards, all the mestizo-related
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groups in Latin America achieved rapidly a dominant position amongst their societies
allowing them to set up the new rules of the game. In building their countries, the mestizo
groups called for a single national identity with the argument that all individuals were
to be ruled under the same policies regardless their cultures, race or social status (Hill
1999). In fact, their constitutions were drafted under these principles of "equality". The
political agenda led by the mestizo groups, however, implicitly disregarded the existence
of a multi-ethnic structure hoping that in a later stage the Amerindian groups would
integrate themselves as full "citizens" into the national projects.
Yet the so called "Indian problem" was far from being solved throughout the post-
colonial period. Since some Amerindian groups played a major role in the post-independence
struggles, they regained some political autonomy within their local communities. For ex-
ample, after the Mexican Revolution, policies on land redistribution shaped constantly the
political agenda of the central governments. A situation that throughout the 20th century
gave way to the conformation of a corporatist relationship between the Amerindian com-
munities and the central governments -a similar pattern took place in Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala and Peru, countries that have one of larger Amerindian groups in Latin Amer-
ica. In theory, this political link aimed to weaken the ethnic identity of Amerindian groups
in order to integrate them into the single national identity. However, in practical terms,
these corporatist policies enabled some of the Amerindian communities to have access to
better social and economic benets, and above all, to increase the space within their local
communities of a certain degree of political autonomy (Deborah 1998).
By the 1980s, the rise of the "indigenous movements" marked the explicit political
importance of Amerindian groups in all Latin America -specially for the larger groups.
Corporativism formulated a dual identity amongst the Amerindian groups -peasants versus
Amerindians- that, on one hand, in dealing with the central government, Amerindians
identied themselves as peasants in order to achieve better social rights. On the other
hand, within their local communities they assumed their role as Amerindians enabling
them to gain local support through a network of cross communal entities (Deborah 2005,
p. 64). As the corporatist regimes started to get weaker, this solid local based Ameridian
community network erupted by claiming -most of the time in a peaceful way- better
benets for their respective communities (Van Cott 2010). Larger Amerindian groups
such as Incas in Peru or Ecuador were engaging with their central governments to demand
better public goods for their communities such as bilingual education (Selverston 1995,
p. 131). In countries with a more dense Amerindian population, larger groups such as
Aymara managed to achieve a national representation allowing them to elect a president
with Amerindian origins in Bolivia in mid-2000s. These waves of Amerindian-based
movements shiftted the national policies from backward views towards the Amerindian
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population to a debate in which the Amerindian groups are not longer seen as isolated
political actors but as relevant elements to foster democracy and economic development.
4.4 Data and Methodology
To test the main hypothesis of the present study I combine two data sources. The main
data source is drawn from the Latinobarometer. This is an annual public opinion survey
on individualsattitudes, values and behaviour towards democracy, economy and society,
covering 18 Latin American countries. The survery has been conducted every year since
mid-1990s. Although the present analysis is mainly based on the 2010s survey, I also
tested the hypothesis with other annual versions after 2001, obtaining similar results.
Versions prior 2001 did not gather data on ethnic identity. Such ethnicity information
was required for the empirical strategy to investigate the di¤erent e¤ects of the legacy
of pre-colonial institutions according to the di¤erent type of populations (e.g. mestizo,
white, indigenous, etc.).
The simple question that measures individualsattitudes towards di¤erent contempo-
rary political institutions in the Latinobarometer is: "...how much trust do you have in
each of the following groups/institutions...?. The respondents are given a list of various
institutions amongst them i) states; ii) national congress; iii) national electoral commis-
sion; and iv) public administration. They are then asked to rank each of these institutions
in the following categorical way: 1) a lot ; 2) some; 3) a litte; and 4) no trust. I create four
di¤erent indicators taking a value of 1 if individualsreponses are categories 1) a lot, 2)
some; 3) a litte; and zero for category 4) no trust. These four indicators will be my main
alternative dependent variables measuring the support of individuals for contemporary
political institutions.
The second data source comes from the state-level dataset prepared for the second
chapter of the present thesis. I am particularly interested in using the index that measures
the institutional complexity among the Amerindian population in each subnational state
of Latin America -please refer to the methodological section of Chapter 2 for more details
on the index. I use this subnational index to explore the main hypothesis of the present
study. As such, I just have to assign to each individual of the survey its respective value
of this index using the location of states as the main criteria for the merging of the data1.
1Amongst the questions that the survey computes is the location of individuals disaggregated into three
levels: countries, states, and cities. I select states to undertake the merging of the data. For example,
explicitly speaking, all the individuals of the survey that indicated living in the state of La Paz, Bolivia,
are taken the value of the index calculated for this Bolivian state. Consequently, the value on levels of
pre-colonial institutions will be the same for individuals living in La Paz.
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With this information at hand, I am in the position to explore the long-run e¤ects of pre-
colonial institutions on peoples attitudes. First, I will assume that individuals are a¤ected
by the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions of the area where they live, regardless of their
ethnic origins. I will call this as an overall e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions. Second, since
the legacy of pre-colonial institutions would not be the same across all the di¤erent ethnic
groups, I will examine if these long-run e¤ects vary depending on whether individuals
identify as Amerindian, Mestizo, White, Blacks, others races, etc.
To explore the overall e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions on the individualsperception I
simply use the information on pre-colonial institutions by itself on my four alternative out-
comes related to the degree of support for contemporary political institutions. If the main
hypothesis of the study is correct, we expect a positive association bewteen them, indi-
cating that areas historically inhabited by more advanced Amerindian groups -as reected
by the information on the levels of pre-colonial institutions- relate to individuals who are
more likely to support the contemporary political institutions. Yet it is important to note
that this e¤ect may be biased due to the fact that individuals in more developed regions
are more likely to support the political system. In consequence, the evidence throughout
this Chapter may be considered cautiously.
The overall e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions on the individualsattitudes will be anal-
ysed by using the following logit regression model:
Logit (i;s;c) = PCIs;c + AmePops;c + Di;s;c + Xs;c + c + "i;s;c (4.1)
In equation 4.1 suscript i indicates individuals, suscript s denotes subnational states
and suscript c signies countries.  is the probability that one of our indicators measuring
the support of individuals for contemporary political institutions is equal to 1. In notation
form, this is the same as Pr( = 1): Our subnational index of pre-colonial institutions is
PCIs;c. It is worth pointing out that in order to easily interpret the e¤ect of our coe¢ cient
for PCI, results will be reporting marginal e¤ects at the means. Thus, the e¤ect would be
in terms of how much Pr( = 1) is predicted to change as  increases by one-unit -holding
all other covariates constant. Of course, the e¤ects of the coe¤cient for our set of controls
would be interpreted similarly.
Turning to our equation 4.1, AmePops;c controls for the share of Amerindian popula-
tion in each state in Latin America. This information was drawn from the same subnational
dataset where our index of pre-colonial institutions was obtained -and thus merged with
the individual-level data using the same steps. This control is important since the inuence
of Amerindians on politics may be due to their sheer numbers instead of their pre-colonial
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institutions. Xs;c is a vector of geographic and historical controls. These variables also
come from such subnational dataset. As we progress in the empirical analysis I will point
out the inclusion of these controls. Di;s;c is a set of individual demographic variables on
age, gender, socioeconomic status, location and educational levels of respondents. Finally,
c is set of country xed e¤ects.
Yet by exploring an overall e¤ect the analysis would then be restricted on the variation
of perception of all the individuals of the survey regardless their respective ethnic identity.
The assumption is that the legacy of pre-colonial institutions would be more marked on
individuals who may have been more exposed to the pre-colonial norms that have persisted
through the Amerindian communities as a result of their possible proximity. This may
be the case for all the variants of the dominant mestizo groups (e.g. Bolivians, Mexicans,
Colombians, etc.). Thus, the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on individuals
attitudes would vary depending on the type of population within each subnational state,
and not just on an overall average e¤ect.
Our second empirical strategy is therefore to explore the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial
institutions on individualsattitudes by using the information of the survey on the di¤erent
ethnic identities of individuals. To do so, I proceed as follows. I implement a series of
two-by-two interactions between the index of pre-colonial institutions and the di¤erent
ethnic identities as classied by the Latinobarometer. Since 2001, the Latinobarometer has
included the questionWhich of these ethnic groups do you belong to?, in order to nd out
the ethnic identity of the respondents. Yet this information has been gathered by using a
generic classication. The 2010s survey, for instance, provides seven ethnic classications:
1) asian; 2) black; 3) indigenous; 4) mestizo; 5) mulato; 6) white; and 7) other race.
Ideally, information on detailed ethnic identity covering the wide range of Amerindian
groups (e.g. Incas, Chibchas, Tobas, etc.) would shed better lights on this empirical
examination. However, with the available information, I can recode indicators for these
seven ethnic classications2. Since there is a strong reason to believe that the long-run
e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions may be di¤erent depending on the type of population, by
interacting each of these indicators with the value of the index of pre-colonial institutions,
I would capture the variation of peoples attitudes towards the contemporary political
institutions not just on the overall e¤ect of pre-colonial factors but on the basis of the
respective group of population.
To investigate the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on individualsattitudes
on the basis of the di¤erent ethnic identities of individuals, I use the following logit re-
2I also aggregated the smaller groups into two indicators: Asian and Other races; Mulatos and Blacks.
I ended up with four indicators: Amerindian, Blacks, Mestizos, White, and Others. Yet, by using this
classication, results do not improve.
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gression model:
Logit (i;s;c) = AmePops;c + IASIANi;s;c + IBLACKi;s;c + IMESTIZOi;s;c +
IMULATOi;s;c + IWHITi;s;c + IOTHERi;s;c + 1PCIi;s;c  IAMERINDIAN;s;c +
2PCI  IASIANi;s;c + 3PCI  IBLACKi;s;c +
4PCI  IMESTIZOi;s;c + 5PCI  IMULATOi;s;c + 6PCI  IWHITi;s;c +
7PCI  IOTHERi;s;c + Di;s;c+Xs;c + c + "i;s;c (4.2)
In specication 4.2 our outcomes will be the same as in equation 4.1; along with the
control for share of Amerindian population -AmePops;c-; the two vectors of controls for
individual demographic characteristics and geography plus historical factors -Di;s;c, Xs;c-
; and the set of country xed e¤ects -c. The di¤erence is that I have now included
seven two-by-two interactions between the index of pre-colonial institution and the seven
indicators on ethnic identity. These interactions are represented in specication 4.2 with
the coe¢ cients 1-7. With the inclusion of these series of two-by-two interactions the
long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on peoples attitudes is now a¤ected by the
changes according to the ethnic identity of individuals. The most signicant changes can
be summarised as follows:
i) There is no longer an overall e¤ect of PCI since now it depends upon the di¤erent
ethnic identities as measured by our seven indicators.
ii) The e¤ect of PCI on the basis of the ethnic identities will be obtained, as above,
by computing the marginal e¤ects at the means. This will allow us to see how much
Pr( = 1) changes as PCI increases by one-unit depending on our seven indicators on
ethnicities - holding all other covariates constant.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A in Table 4.1 shows summary statistics on our four alternative outcomes measuring
the degree of support for contemporary political institutions for the whole sample3 These
indicators report the individuals within each state of the 17 Latin American countries
3It is worth noting that the 19, 204 observations come from 253 states belonging to 17 Latin American
countries. The number of states di¤ers from the subnational dataset prepared for the rst chapter -
standing at 324 states- due to data collection criteria implemented by the Latinobarometer. For example,
for some countries the criteria was to use major regions rather than the actual states. That was the case
for Brazil and Colombia. For this, I simply average the values from the subnational dataset depending
on the respective region applied in the survey. The aim was to synchronise the variables from both data
sources.
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supporting the i) states; ii) national congress; iii) national electoral commission; and iv)
public administration. The percentage of individuals supporting these four alternative na-
tional institutions range between 73 to 79, suggesting that almost three in one individuals
in Latin America seem to support this selected set of contemporary political institutions.
Note that the strong degree of support for political institutions may be overestimated due
to -but not only- country-specic national policies inuencing upwards peoples attitudes
-an issue that we want to tackle with the use of country-xed e¤ects.
The summary statistics of our main variable of interest is also reported in Table 4.1.
After assigning to each respondent of the survey the respective value of the index of
pre-colonial institutions from his/her subnational state, the variable on pre-colonial insti-
tutions gets a mean value of .62. This relative small number is not surprising since most
of the values of the index are towards zero. Yet this number hides an important variation.
For example, for the individuals in Ecuador or Bolivia the total mean of their values of
pre-colonial institutions is around 1 and 3, respectively. This variable by itse, thus, will
be capturing the overall long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on the four alternative
outcomes on the degree of contemporary political institutions.
Demographic and socioeconomic controls are also reported in Table 4.1. As a notewor-
thy point on this information is that around of 95% of the individuals come from urban
areas. This is of relevance for the empirical investigation since, as outlined before, mestizos
tend to live in larger cities where the inuence of pre-colonial norms may not be as marked
as in rural areas. Yet I may argue that if the analysis favours the main hypohesis, I would
then assume that by increasing the percentage of individuals from rural areas the results
would be more robust -specially when I analyse the e¤ect according to the di¤erent ethnic
composition. The rest of the rows report summary statistics on the following controls:
share of Amerindian population, demography and historical factors. All these last set
of controls come from the subnational dataset prepared in Chapter 2 as well. Thus, the
information of these controls was assigned to each respondents in the same way as with
the values of the index of pre-colonial institutions. Note that due to the missing data on
some of our historical controls, the sample size slightly reduces, yet the remaining data
still allows us to exploit nearly 90% of the total number of observations in the analysis.
Panel B in Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the indicators on the various ethnic
identities as classied by the 2010s Latinobarometer. The means of the indicators show
the fraction of the population in the survey data of each ethnic identity. Nearly half of the
population identied itself as having mestizo origins -in other words with a mix of European
and Amerindian origins-. The second largest ethnic group is the white population, with
nearly 30% of individuals having European origins. The remaining individuals indicated
having either Asian (0.08%), Indigenous (8%), Black(3%), Mulato (5%) or Other (7%)
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A
Main outcomes:
Indicator supporting the State 18461 0.7928606 0.4052673 0 1
Indicator supporting the Congress 18446 0.7343598 0.4416855 0 1
Indicator supporting the Electoral Body 18231 0.7916187 0.406162 0 1
Indicator supporting the Pub. Admin. 18322 0.7722956 0.4193623 0 1
Main Independent variable:
Pre-colonial Institutions (PCI) 19204 0.627872 1.118814 0 3.997829
Individual-level controls:
Socioeconomic level 19204 2.695428 0.89061 1 5
Rural 19204 0.046084 0.209673 0 1
Urban 19204 0.953916 0.209673 0 1
Illiterate 19204 0.098834 0.298446 0 1
Incomplete primary 19204 0.194595 0.395899 0 1
Complete primary 19204 0.174859 0.379857 0 1
Incomplete secondary 19204 0.136899 0.343749 0 1
Complete secondary 19204 0.225786 0.41811 0 1
Incomplete high 19204 0.082639 0.275343 0 1
Complete high 19204 0.086388 0.280944 0 1
Male 19204 0.480733 0.499642 0 1
Female 19204 0.519267 0.499642 0 1
Age 19204 40.18517 16.5252 16 96
Age squared 19204 1887.916 1517.718 256 9216
Subnational level controls:
Share of Amerindian population 19204 0.088615 0.169105 0.000163 0.941406
Latitude 19204 16.86296 10.08407 0.015341 52.47901
Altitude 19204 0.736463 0.950766 0 4.049
Temperature 19160 20.26219 5.131414 5.028432 27.43242
Land area (km. sq.) 19204 54777.23 92461.33 63.1 605709.2
Distance to capital 19204 316.1279 351.2065 0 2103.238
Inverse distance to the sea 19160 0.899102 0.093606 0.618014 0.99904
Landlocked 19204 0.515101 0.499785 0 1
Oil and gas resources 19204 0.168663 0.374464 0 1
Gold and silver resources 19204 0.235993 0.424629 0 1
Population density (logs) 19204 4.198514 1.721223 -1.96108 10.98031
Pre-colonial population density 17827 0.763271 2.562362 -9.5814 5.972121
Other colonial economic activities 16677 0.78977 0.407484 0 1
Mining during colonial period 16677 0.191761 0.393698 0 1
Plantations during colonial period 16677 0.121785 0.327047 0 1
Panel B
Indicators:
Asian 19204 0.008071 0.089479 0 1
Black 19204 0.034055 0.181376 0 1
Amerindiand 19204 0.083264 0.276288 0 1
Mestizo 19204 0.439856 0.496383 0 1
Mulato 19204 0.052489 0.223017 0 1
White 19204 0.299052 0.457855 0 1
Other 19204 0.073995 0.26177 0 1
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ethnic origins. Quite remarkably is that the mean of our indicator of interest measuring
the fraction of the Amerindian population (Indigenous) seems to have a similar value
as the mean of the control variable on the share of Amerindian population drawn from
statistics quantifying the total population within each country.
4.5 Empirical Results
The rst empirical strategy explores the overall long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions
on the degree of support for contemporary political institutions. The assumption is that
individuals are a¤ected by the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions of the region where they
live regardless of their ethnic origins. To start this examination, in Table 4.2, I use as our
dependent variable the indicator on whether individuals support the state or not. Since our
outcome takes a binary form, I report Logit estimators all along the specications. I run
four separate regressions by including all through our variable of interest on pre-colonial
institutions. Controls will be added gradually so that our main coe¤cient is under an
in-depth examination. As mentioned before, to easily interpret the results, I am reporting
marginal e¤ects at the means.
In model (1) from Table 4.2, the variable on pre-colonial institutions is included by
itself, along with country-xed e¤ects. I then cluster standard errors at country-level all
through the specications4. As mentioned before, the inclusion of xed e¤ects is important
due to the fact that key country-specic unobservable factors may be a¤ecting our results.
For instance, some -but not only- of the e¤ects that I am interested in controlling for
are the policies implemented by the central governments that may have had a strong
inuence on peoples attitudes. The assumption is that through these national policies the
presence of central governments reaches out remote communities a¤ecting the perception
of individuals towards the role of national political institutions. If this may be the case,
individuals would support the national political institutions regardless what kind of legacy
of pre-colonial institutions they have. So, by not controlling for these hard-to-account-
for- unobservables factors, the e¤ect of our variable of interest may be potentially biased.
As it stands, the marginal e¤ects for our coe¢ cient of interest -- show a positive and
signicant probability of sucess conditional on key country-specic unobservable factors.
As PCI increases by one-unit the change in the probability that individuals would support
the state is about 2.5%. This result supports already the main hypothesis of the present
study.
In the second regression from Table 4.2, the control for the total share of Amerindian
population in each state is added. By addding this control the coe¢ cient on pre-colonial
4I also cluster standard errors at both subnational state and country levels. Results are not a¤ected.
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Table 4.2: Pre-Colonial Institutions and Population Supporting
the State
Dependent variable: Population Supporting the State
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0251* 0.0248* 0.0246* 0.0331***
(0.0144) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0103)
Share of Amerindian pop. 0.00447 0.00979 0.0450
(0.0617) (0.0611) (0.0699)
Log population density -0.00362 0.00321
(0.00346) (0.00375)
Demographic controls:
Socio economic level (ref. Very good)
Good -0.0130 -0.0146
(0.00959) (0.0108)
Not bad -0.0344*** -0.0470***
(0.0118) (0.0111)
Bad -0.0525** -0.0713***
(0.0218) (0.0216)
Very bad -0.0732** -0.0916***
(0.0335) (0.0286)
Area (ref. Rural) -0.0271 -0.0375**
(0.0199) (0.0179)
Education (ref. Illiterate)
Incomplete primary 0.00695 3.24e-05
(0.0153) (0.0180)
Complete primary -0.00294 -0.00395
(0.0219) (0.0258)
Incomplete Secondary, technical 0.0125 0.00653
(0.0191) (0.0216)
Complete Secondary, technical 0.0153 0.00751
(0.0201) (0.0232)
Incomplete high 0.0302 0.0190
(0.0237) (0.0260)
Complete high 0.0321 0.0212
(0.0231) (0.0261)
Gender (ref. Male) -0.00327 -0.00278
(0.00585) (0.00644)
Age -0.00272** -0.00197*
(0.00114) (0.00109)
Age-squared 2.62e-05** 1.85e-05*
(1.16e-05) (1.11e-05)
Geography, location, and
natural resources:
Latitude -0.000933
(0.00197)
Altitude (km.) -0.00824
(0.00671)
Temperature (Celsius) 0.00262
(0.00224)
Land area (sq. km.) 3.70e-08
(9.27e-08)
Distance to capital (km.) 6.18e-05*
(3.19e-05)
Inverse distance to coast 0.152
(0.132)
Landlocked dummy 8.87e-05
(0.0182)
Oil & Gas dummy 0.0248
(0.0288)
Gold & Silver dummy 0.0381**
(0.0157)
Historical controls: colonial &
pre-colonial
Pre-colonial population density -0.00149
(0.00400)
Other colonial activities -0.0119
(0.0294)
Mining -0.00179
(0.0307)
Plantations -0.0211
(0.0422)
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 18,461 18,461 18,461 15,864
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country levels are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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institutions is not a¤ected. This is not surpring since the coe¢ cient on the share of
Amerindian population is insignicant. It seems that by operationalising this control at
the individual-level the expected e¤ect is unclear. Regression (3) from Table 4.2 includes
our control for population density, along with a set of individual characteristics on age, age
squared, gender, education, areas and socieconomic level. As it can be seen, the marginal
e¤ects for the coe¢ cient  is stable. In model (4), I control for geography and historical
factors. As it stands, our coe¢ cient of interest on pre-colonial institutions remains positive
and very signicant. Though, the e¤ect is relatively small. The coe¢ cient takes a value
of 3.3%. If we consider the average value of the indicator measuring the degree of support
for the state of 79% with a standard deviation of 40%, then an increase of one-unit of our
index of pre-colonial institutions would only lead to 0.08 standard deviation change in the
probability of individuals supporting the state.
Table 4.3 reports our results on the e¤ects between the legacy of pre-colonial insti-
tutions and the four alternative indicators on contemporary political institutions. The
regressions use specication (4) from Table 4.2 as our baseline model, and the outcomes
on whether individuals support the state, national congress, electoral bodies and public
administration. The results are consistent with the main hypothesis of the present chapter.
In all the regressions the marginal e¤ects for our coe¢ cients on pre-colonial institutions
show the correct sign and very high signicant levels. Interestingly, the marginal e¤ects
for the coe¢ cients  in models (1)-(3) reect a higher sucess of individuals supporting
the state, congress and electoral bodies, as compared to the coe¤cient for the specication
on supporting public administration. This may suggest that areas historically inhabited
by institutionally advanced Amerindian groups tend to have a stronger perception on the
role of the main central authorities over any other type of governmental entity. It is also
worth remarking the results in model (3). The results of this model may go in line with
the recent ndings emphasizing the growing role of the Amerindian population in shaping
the electoral systems in Latin America (Van Cott 2010). It may suggest that the degree
of political salient of ethnic cleavages may be rooted in the legacy of institutional com-
plexity of Amerindian groups in Latin America, holding constant the e¤ect of the share
of Amerindian population.
Yet what we have been capturing so far is an overall long-run e¤ect of pre-colonial insti-
tutions. This implies that all the population as a whole -Amerindians or non-Amerindians-
may have been a¤ected by an e¤ect that is meant to have persisted -principally- in the
remote Amerindian communities. Such a conclusion may be, however, put into question
easily, considering that the ethnic composition in Latin America since the 18th century
came to be signicantly transformed by particularly what is today the di¤erent variant of
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Table 4.3: Pre-Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Political
Institutions
Dependent variables: Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting
State Congress Electoral Body Admin. Public
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0331*** 0.0375*** 0.0269*** 0.0163***
(0.0103) (0.0122) (0.00726) (0.00455)
Controls for:
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES YES YES
Historical controls: colonial &
pre-colonial YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 15,864 15,817 15,638 15,741
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country levels are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the dominant groups called mestizos. These dominant groups have mostly been shaped
by the post-colonial political institutional features making less likely that their present-
day political attitudes may have been inuenced by the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial
institutions. In addition to this large group, there are other ethnic compositions that are
of relevance for some Latin American countries. For instance, the population that came
through the slave trade is nowadays an important ethnic composition for countries like
Colombia, Venezuela or Brazil. Moreover, the Europeans that settled permanently, and
that today are meant to be related as being part of the white group, is more predominant
in some countries in South America such as Chile and Argentina.
Thus, I next focus on the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on the basis of the
di¤erent ethnic compositions in Latin America. Our main motivation to carry out such
approach is based on the possibility that the legacy of pre-colonial factors may depend
on what type of population we are dealing with. To conduct such examination I will use
the ethnic identities as classied by our survey data in the way that was explained in the
previous section on data and methodology.
Table 4.4 reports the main results regarding the interactions of the di¤erent ethnic
identities and our measure of long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions. We are using
our four di¤erent alternative outcomes on the degree of support for contemporary political
institutions, along with the battery of controls as of model (4) from Table 4.2. The
only di¤erence is that six two-by-two interactions -1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-, plus their
respective indicators -IASIANi;s;c, IBLACKi;s;c, IAMERINDIAN;s;c; IMESTIZOi;s;c, IMULATOi;s;c,
IWHITi;s;c, IASIANi;s;c, IOTHERi;s;c- are included on these specications.
The results are meaningful. The long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions do seem
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Table 4.4: Population groups
Dependent variables: Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting
State Congress Electoral Body Admin. Public
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0330*** 0.0359 0.0256** 0.0093
PCI*dummy for Amerindians (0.0094) (0.0243) (0.0109) (.0069)
Maginal e¤ects of 0.0565 0.0912** 0.2169*** 0.0852**
PCI*dummy for Asians (0.0392) (0.0398) (0.0818) (.0459)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0148 0.0323 -0.0067 0.0167
PCI*dummy for Blacks (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0232) (.0205)
Maginal e¤ects of 0.0352** 0.0345*** 0.0256*** 0.0147***
PCI*dummyfor Mestizos (0.0180) (0.009) (0.0073) (.0039)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0225 0.0359 0.0104 0.0401**
PCI*dummy for Mulatos (0.0194) (0.0239) (0.0183) (0.0175)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0377*** 0.0333*** 0.0365*** 0.0175*
PCI*dummy for Whites (0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0093)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0251* 0.0491*** 0.0366*** 0.0237
PCI*dummy for Other Races (0.0129) (0.015) (0.0099) (0.0156)
p-value Wald test 0.000 0.5199 0.0114 0.0025
Controls for:
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES YES YES
Historical controls: colonial &
pre-colonial YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 15,714 15,665 15,491 15,590
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country levels are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to vary depending on the major ethnic identity of individuals yet this di¤erence is not
statistically signicant in model 2 as reported by the p-value for the Wald test. The
marginal e¤ect of PCI through the Amerindian population is only positive and signicant
in model (1) and (3). The e¤ects through the Mestizo andWhite groups are always positive
and signicant. Interestingly, the marginal e¤ects of Amerindians, Mestizos, and Whites
are about the same. Perhaps, the ethnic identity with the lesser connection with the pre-
colonial institutions is the Black and Mulato groups. This may suggest that Mulato and
Blacks groups tend to be more excluded from the political sphere, and thus the e¤ects of
PCI are the least clear. Though, this result may be to due to the fact that these groups
have the lowest proportion of population.
Overall, the results of Table 4.4 suggests that the e¤ects of PCI through the Amerindian
population is not as big or di¤erent than the rest of the population, particularly with
respect to the largest groups such as Mestizos and Whites. Yet we may say that the
e¤ects of PCI tend to be di¤erent depending on the type of population. This may provide
evidence of some positive externalities of the pre-colonial institutions coming from the
Amerindian communities towards other ethnic groups in Latin America.
4.5.1 Robustness checks
The robustness of the results are tested against various alternative approaches. First,
I contruct an indicator taking a value of one if the four indicators on supporting the
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Table 4.5: Robustness checks (Logit vs Probit)
Dependent variable: Indicator measuring the degree of support for all
the contemporary institutions
Logit Logit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0345** 0.0347**
(0.0143) (0.0142)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0255 0.0252
PCI*dummy for Amerindians (0.0176) (0.0175)
Maginal e¤ects of 0.1391** 0.1368**
PCI*dummy for Asians (0.0629) (0.0559)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0365 0.0373
PCI*dummy for Blacks (0.0324) (0.0327)
Maginal e¤ects of 0.0364** 0.0366**
PCI*dummyfor Mestizos (0.0159) (0.0159)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0341 0.0333
PCI*dummy for Mulatos (0.0213) (0.0213)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0299* 0.0304*
PCI*dummy for Whites (0.0159) (0.0159)
Marginal e¤ects of 0.0355** 0.0358***
PCI*dummy for Other Races (0.0139) 0.0138
p-value Wald test 0.2409 0.1686
Controls for:
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES
Geography, location, and
natural resources YES YES YES YES
Historical controls: colonial &
pre-colonial YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 16,451 16,294 16,451 16,294
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country levels are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
state, congress, electoral boby, and public administration are all equal to one, and zero
otherwise. In models (1)-(2) of Table 4.5, we report Logit estimators. These specications
are using the same controls as of specication (4) from Table 4.2. Though, in model
(1) the variable on pre-colonial institutions is included by itself so its coe¢ cient will be
capturing the overall e¤ect as specied in our rst empirical strategy. As the results stand,
by aggregating our outcome to report individuals supporting all the four contemporary
political institutions, Logit estimators still conrm our results from Tables 4.2-4.4.
In model (2), I report results using the second empirical strategy by including the seven
two-by-two interactions plus the indicators for each ethnic identity. The results once again
show a marked variation of the e¤ect of PCI depending on the major ethnic identities in
Latin America, though the di¤erence is not statistically signicant as reported by the
p-value for the Wald test.
Second, while previous results were obtained through Logit estimators, in models (3)-
(4) of Table 4.5 we report results using Probit estimators. While model (3) shows the
overall e¤ect, in model (4) the seven two-by-two interactions are added. The results are
essentially held.
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4.6 Conclusions
The present study investigated the mechanisms of the long-run e¤ects of pre-colonial insti-
tutional advancements. According to our historical context, the colonial and post-colonial
strategies implemented on the basis of an indirect rule plus the political advancements
of Amerindian groups have worked in tandem allowing the larger Amerindian groups to
support the new political systems in order to gain more political and economic benits
for their respective groups. This mechanism has allowed, on one hand, the e¤ects of pre-
colonial institutions to persist throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods, and on
the other, to a¤ect socieconomic development outcomes in the long-run.
To shed lights on this mechanism, I combined novel data measuring the levels of pre-
colonial institutions in each subnational state in Latin America and individual-level data
on peoples attitudes. The main empirical results showed that areas with a history of more
advanced pre-colonial institutions relate to a higher probability of population supporting
contemporary political institutions. Moreover, my results also showed that the e¤ect of
PCI may vary depending on the major ethnic identities given some evidence of some
positive externalities coming from the Amerindian communities. Overall, this suggests
that institutionally-advanced pre-colonial ethnic groups have been in a better position to
process through a certain degree of support the new political systems in ways that would
benet their respective ethnic groups.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of key ndings of the thesis
The present doctoral thesis studied the relationship between pre-colonial institutions and
long-run development in the context of Latin American countries. The evidence pro-
vided throughout the thesis contribute to the existing literature in place for the case of
the African nations: Latin American pre-colonial institutions are relevant predictors of
present-day measures of socioeconomic development.
What remained after colonisation 500 years ago was not a mirror image of European
society but a new reality where pre-colonial culture and institutions survived. The his-
torical narrative underlined that pre-colonial institutions survived to our days thanks to
the existence of largely self-governed Amerindian communities in rural Latin America.
The existence of these Amerindian communities, inadvertently, kept alive the notion of
large pre-colonial nations in the places where these existed. The central hypothesis of the
present doctoral thesis is that these institutional factors continue to exert an inuence on
socioeconomic development to our days.
The main empirical ndings of the present thesis support the above hypothesis. Using
a cross-section of 324 subnational states in Latin America, Chapter 2 uncovered a strong
positive e¤ect between pre-colonial institutions and various socieconomic outcomes an
e¤ect that has been mainly transmitted through the Amerindian population. Results
were tested against various alternatives such as controlling for country-xed e¤ects which
allowed me to remove national factors than otherwise may have been potentially a¤ected
my estimates. In the spirit to dispel other major forces driving the variation of development
over the long-run, I also controlled for other important factors related to geographical
fundamentals, as well as historical events such as the type of economic activity in place
in the colonial period and the economic and social prole of pre-colonial societies in
addition to the institutional complexity of ethnic groups. Lastly, I also showed that the
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inuence of pre-colonial institutions in rural areas is far stronger providing evidence about
the historical account I gave for the transmission of pre-colonial factors.
Chapter 3 took forward the study of the association between pre-colonial institutions
and present-day economic development in Latin America. I used historical ethnic home-
lands as my main unit of analysis. This involved relying on GIS techniques in order to
digitise historiographical maps which allowed me to identify the geospatial location of
ethnic homelands in Latin America as of the XVI century. This approach essentially con-
rmed my previous ndings. I showed that ethnic homelands inhabited by more advanced
ethnic groups -as measured by their levels of institutional complexity- relate to better
economic development today -as reected by satellite light density data.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I studied a mechanism linking the persistency of pre-colonial in-
stitutions over the long-run regarding the ethnic political capacity and the main strategy
of dominance implemented by the colonial and post-colonial systems. As noted in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, the political capacity of ethnic groups tended to be very heterogeneous at the
time of contact with the Europeans. As such, after the conquest, larger ethnic groups were
more likely to have endured the new systems introduced via the colonial and post-colonial
regimes. Moreover, and in front of key factor endowments, the type of colonial system
based on indirect strategies of dominance gave rise to numerous self-governed Amerindian
communities all along Latin America. These historical forces may have given way in areas
traditionally inhabited by larger groups to some degree of "support" to the new political
systems resulting in better social and economic benets for both the Amerindian communi-
ties and the population at large. The Chapter undertook an empirical strategy combining
our index of pre-colonial institutions with individual-level survey data on peoples atti-
tudes. Results showed that areas with a history of more advanced pre-colonial institutions
increase the probability of individuals supporting present-day political institutions. This
degree of "support" was then taken as a possible explanation regarding this mechanism
linking the persistency of pre-colonial institutions over the long-run.
5.2 Challenges and potential avenues for future re-
search
The present doctoral thesis has not been possible without the overwhelming contributions
in place in the literarure as well as the colossal work of other areas of knowledge outside
economics. Anthropology, history, and political science helped putting in the right place
the main hypothesis of the thesis.
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While enormous e¤orts were made in order to dissipate possible biases, some key
empirical challenges remained to be addressed, for which case one may want to consider
them as potential avenues for future research.
As one of the most relevant challenge is regarding the possible externalities expelled
by the pre-colonial factors towards the non-Amerindian population. As you may recall,
the e¤ect that I introduced all along the present thesis has mainly been carried through
the Amerindian population as pointed out in Chapter 2. Thus, considering that all the
dependent variables at my disposal have measured the socioeconomic levels for the whole
population in each subnational state, and not for its Amerindian component, one may
want to question whether some pre-colonial externalities have taken place to the rest of
the population, as well as the extent to which this has been done. One alternative way
to start making progress on this is to use information on socieconomic outcomes for the
di¤erent ethnic composition in Latin America (e.g. whites, blacks, mestizos, indigenous,
etc.). By estimating econometrically the association between these separate outcomes
corresponding to one of the di¤erent ethnic composition, and our measure of pre-colonial
institutions, perhaps, some systematic heterogeneity in a single or more ethnic groups may
be revealed.
I would also emphasise the relevance of digging more into the mechanisms linking
the persistency of pre-colonial institutions. While the present thesis o¤ered a possible
explanation on this, the e¤ects are less clear. Perhaps, one of the weaknesses of this
investigation -undertaken in Chapter 4- is the way that our main variable measuring
the pre-colonial institutions was operationalised, taken it from a subnational level to an
individual setting. One possible alternative is to direct the attention to a mechanism
that researchers may nd less problematic to validate both the historical account and the
empirical approach. A potential mechanism is that related to the institutional capacity of
Amerindian groups to organize themselves and defend their interests in front of colonial
and post-colonial regimes.
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Table A.4: Contrasting rural and urban areas
Dependent variable Primary education Secondary education Drinking water Electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.000495 0.0149 0.105** 0.112*
[0.0111] [0.0355] [0.0472] [0.0628]
Pre-Colonial Institutions*Dummy_rural 0.0240** 0.0739*** 0.0491 0.0561*
[0.0105] [0.0210] [0.0339] [0.0314]
Controls included:
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES
Log population density YES YES YES YES
Controls for geography, location
and natural resources YES YES YES YES
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 581 581 581 581
Adjusted R-squared 0.828 0.784 0.548 0.565
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Argentina has been removed from the sample for this table.
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